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Abstract 
This study examines women’s political representation in pre-election (candidate nomination), 
election, and post-election (legislative activities) stages in South Korea. First, I examined 
factors contributing to electing women to the National Assembly in the eight national 
legislative elections since democratization in 1987. I conducted statistical analysis to examine 
how a candidate’s political experience, major party nomination, incumbency, and districts’ 
party loyalty affect the candidate’s electoral victory and how each influences women and 
men differently. I also interviewed candidates, candidate aspirants, elected legislators, 
legislative staffers, scholars and activists on their personal experiences with major party 
nomination and election campaigns.  
Second, I analyzed how legislators’ gender, partisanship, ideology, and gender 
stereotypes interact in shaping lawmakers’ legislative priorities. Using digital archives, I 
tracked who proposed women-friendly bills in the previous four Assemblies (2000-2016) and 
analyzed how invisible factors such as electoral rules, the culture of parliaments, party 
affiliation, and their seat types affect lawmakers’ legislative agendas and productivity, using 
both statistical analysis and interview analysis.  
This research contributes to the literature on gender and politics. There is very little 
known about the effectiveness of gender quotas on women’s political representation in the 
South Korean context. By identifying promotional or inhibitive factors leading to the 
election of more women to the national legislature, the findings propose policy measures 
that appear more effective in tackling the issue of women’s underrepresentation in politics. 
Based on original data in Korean language, this research also provides valuable resources for 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Holistic View of Gender and Political Representation in the 
National Legislature  
 
Statement of the Problem 
This research examines women’s political representation in post-democratized South Korea 
at the pre-election, election and the post-election stages. Since the first female national 
legislator Dr. Young-shin Yim took her seat in 1949, the increase in the number of women 
in the National Assembly of South Korea has been glacial. As of March 2017, 17 percent of 
the South Korean national legislators are women, which is still well below the January 2017 
world the average of 23.2 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). The average proportion 
of women in Asia’s national parliaments in lower and upper houses is 19.3 percent in the 
same period (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016).  
Women are still numerical minorities in the National Assembly of South Korea in 
spite of adopting voluntary party gender quotas for Single Member District seats (SMDs) 
and a 50 percent legislative quota for seats elected through Proportional Representation (PR) 
since 2004. Moreover, existing literature suggests that the electoral system is one of the most 
influential determinants of how many political minorities are elected. Countries with PR 
systems tend to have higher share of women in legislatures compared to those with SMD, 
majority/plurality rules (Rule 1987, 1994; Salmond 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; 
Studlar and McAllister 2002; Tremblay 2006). South Korea is an economically developed and 
democratic country which features proportional representation and gender quotas, the two 
institutional factors which existing literature points out as strong predictor of women’s 
political integration. Then what explains persistent gender imbalance in the National 
Assembly of South Korea?  
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Theories and Research Questions 
Evaluating Effectiveness of Gender Quotas 
Currently, a 50 percent legislative quota for PR candidates is in effect in Korea. Major 
political parties in Korea have adopted voluntary party gender quotas for SMD candidates as 
well, even though they fail to nominate as many women as they pledge to. Sometimes, major 
political parties nominate women candidates to “winnable” districts – “strategic nomination” 
is what the parties call these cases – to increase the possibilities of more districts electing 
women. These measures are not without contention, and frequently the parties cancel these 
nomination plans after facing fierce opposition by other male party members.  
In spite of strong opposition within and outside parties, how has South Korea 
successfully adopted a legislative gender quota for PR? There are four theories to explain 
why countries adopt gender quotas. These theories are not mutually exclusive but related in 
various ways. First, women’s groups demand gender quotas as an effective tool to promote 
women’s political representation. Possible actors include women’s organizations inside 
political parties, women’s movements in civil society, international women’s groups, or even 
individual women close to politically powerful men (Bruhn 2003; Kittilson 2006 cited in 
Krook 2009, 9).   
Second, political elites strategically adopt gender quotas when they compete for 
political support with other parties, especially in many Western European parties (Krook and 
O’Brien 2010, 261). When a party is struggling with losing popularity, it may adopt gender 
quotas to appeal to women voters, thus to expand its potential support base. The same can 
be the case for political leaders concerning fallible legitimacy of the regime. Thus, the 
motivation behind adopting gender quotas by political leaders is not necessarily their passion 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.6 
 
for empowering women, but their interests in accomplishing other political goals (Krook 
2009, 10).  
Third, the mandate of the international norm of promoting women’s political 
representation influences embracing gender quotas worldwide (Paxton and Hughes 2006). 
After the UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, developing countries adopted 
gender quotas (Chen 2010, 13). At the Conference, all 189 member states unanimously 
signed the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and pledged to take measures to 
ensure women’s equal access and full participation in decision-making bodies and leadership 
positions (Krook 2006).   
Fourth, the domestic crises or democratic transition can open a window of 
opportunity for adopting gender quotas. Using the cases of Afghanistan and Rwanda for a 
comparative analysis, Mona Tajali argued that women’s movement and international actors 
are organized and prepared to take advantage of post-conflict reconstruction period which 
offers “a clean slate” to push for women’s presence in politics (Tajali 2013, 262). Related to 
the third theory of international influence, developing countries are more receptive to 
international norms or demands for policies on social justice, in part to ameliorate ethnic or 
tribal conflict (Tajali 2013, 270).  
Interestingly, most controversies over gender quotas in South Korea are brewing in 
relation to SMD candidacies rather than PR candidate list, which partly explains why 
adopting legislative gender quotas was possible only for PR seats. In spite of continuing 
effort by activists and legislators with strong feminist agenda, quotas for SMD seats have not 
been adopted yet in South Korea. According to Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo (2012), the 
successful implementation of gender quotas is contingent upon other political institutions such 
as electoral systems, but it seems that even the possibility of adopting gender quotas is related 
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to the type of electoral system. Due to its mixed electoral system, South Korea makes a good 
case for comparison with different electoral tiers (district and national) presentation of 
opportunities and barriers when adopting and implementing gender quotas.  
The effects and party dynamics surrounding gender quotas in South Korea have not 
adequately examined in an empirical, systematic manner. The heated controversies over 
gender quotas and reasons for or against quotas are not unique to South Korea, but similar 
concerns are raised in other countries. One way to assess the impact of gender quota is to 
explore to what extent the measures empower and strengthen minorities’ political 
competitiveness. Existing literature notes that being incumbents and having previous 
political experience gives a significant advantage to women running for office (Herrnson, 
Lay, and Stokes 2003; Studlar and McAllister 1991). In South Korea, the women candidates 
who won the election in the 17th legislative election had either competed in districts with a 
strong affinity to their own parties, or districts where they were incumbents, supporting 
findings in the existing literature.  
Political experience not only increases one’s prospects for being elected, but also 
even being nominated (Hwang 2006; W.-H. Kim and Kim 2004). Some studies expect a 
positive influence of serving as PR members for women candidates. Ki-young Shin (2014) 
argued that gender quotas in PR has a “spillover effect,” whereby “women elected via 
proportional representation quotas are later nominated and re-elected to single-member 
district seats for which parties do not apply quotas” (Shin 2014, 80). However, Shin did not 
examine how many PR women could successfully secure SMD seats for the following term.  
According to the electoral law, PR members cannot serve more than one term as PR 
members, and they need to compete for SMD seats if they want to continue their political 
career. The fact that the majority of women legislators are elected through the PR system 
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and gender quotas are applicable only to PR seats. How much positive impact, if any, would 
serving as PR members bring to women for their bids for SMD seats is an important 
question to answer. Otherwise, gender quotas will be a mere one-time opportunity for 
recruiting minorities with very little lasting effect of empowering them. Do male PR 
members enjoy the same level of “competitiveness boost,” in SMD elections like their 
female counterparts? If there are differences in the effect of PR incumbency by gender, what 
does that imply? South Korea’s mixed electoral system provides a good case study to 
examine the potential spillover effects of gender quotas in the form of strengthening 
women’s electoral competitiveness through the experiences they gained serving as PR 
members.  
 
Political Parties, Candidate Nomination, and Elections 
The existing literature has focused on women, voters, and political elites to examine the 
reasons for women’s numerical underrepresentation in legislatures (Niven 2006). However, 
studies have demonstrated time and again that the first two are not critical reasons for 
women’s low level of political participation and numerical representation. Studies based on 
Western European and North American cases show that once their names are placed on 
ballots, there is little evidence that voters are biased against women candidates, but political 
parties are biased against women candidates and affect their nomination outcomes as 
gatekeepers.  
Women are less likely to consider running for office than men are, and women need 
encouragement and recruitment efforts from political party elites to decide to run for office. 
However, women are less frequently approached by political recruiters than men (Fox and 
Lawless 2010; Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, and Walsh 2009). Party-level factors such as party’s 
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organization, nomination process, ideologies, and women’s participation in parties affect 
women’s representation in industrialized democracies (Caul 1999). Women’s involvement in 
the party leadership and gender composition of party gatekeepers influence nomination 
outcomes for women (Cheng and Tavits 2011; Kunovich and Paxton 2005), which implies 
parties’ leverage in electoral outcomes for political minorities. Parties not only decide who 
should run but where to run: women are more likely to be encouraged to drop out of a state 
legislative race than men are, especially in districts where partisan support for their party is 
strong (Niven 2006). Even successful implementation of gender quotas are contingent upon 
political parties’ compliance with the provisions, thus enforcement measures are needed to 
change the way parties operate in the recruitment practices (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008). 
Some studies focusing on South Korean elections also found the similar dynamics of 
candidate nomination by political parties, and the possibility that women are at a 
disadvantage in this pre-election process (Kim 2012; Yoo 2012; Yoon 2012). 
Following the literature, this research examines how and to what extent political 
parties influence nomination and electoral outcomes in South Korean legislative elections, 
especially for women. The role of political parties in electoral outcomes can be even more 
critical in the South Korean context, where party mandates are strong and parties’ 
organizations are centralized. The candidate nomination process in South Korea is 
conducted by each party’s nomination committees at the national level and they assign 
candidates to districts; even though candidates apply for specific districts’ candidacy, it is not 
guaranteed that their preferences are reflected in the final district assignment (there are no 
residency requirements to run in a specific district). The candidate selection and district 
assignment is largely dependent on discretion and assessment of the nomination committee 
of each political party. Not surprisingly, bribery charges against major political party elites 
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during and after the nomination period make news headlines every election cycle, nullifying 
some electoral outcomes when found guilty. 
The core questions related to the nomination and the election stage are: what factors 
explain women’s continued numerical underrepresentation in the Korean National 
Assembly? Is the level of support for a candidate in a district determined by personal 
candidate factors, such as political experiences or the educational level? Or, does the level of 
support vary, depending on other political factors such as winning nominations from major 
parties or running in a district with strong party support to the candidate’s party? Are 
women and men candidates affected differently by these variables? Does a candidate’s sex 
affect voters’ decisions on election day? Are women candidates systematically placed in the 
less winnable districts by the political parties?   
 
Gender, Party, and Legislative Activities 
What do women deliver when they are elected? Do women and men legislators have 
distinctive legislative priorities? Is the gender identity of a lawmaker a strong predictor of 
one’s legislative behavior? If legislators’ policy priorities are indeed gendered, how does 
legislators’ partisanship and pressure from districts interact with these gendered policy 
interests? Regarding factors affecting lawmakers’ legislative priorities, the existing literature 
presents two competing models, namely the descriptive representation model and the 
constituency model. The descriptive representation model stresses the importance of 
legislators’ unique experiences in determining one’s legislative behaviors. Thus it argues that 
factors such as gender and race affect the legislative behaviors (Bratton and Haynie 1999; 
Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007).  
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Similarly, studies have provided empirical evidence that many women legislators do 
feel an obligation to represent women constituents and prioritize women-friendly agendas in 
their legislative portfolios, and having more women in legislatures leads to more policy 
responsiveness to women (Bratton and Ray 2002; Caiazza 2004; S. Carroll 2000; Childs 2002; 
Crowley 2004; J. Dolan 1998; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; 
Saint-Germain 1989; Schulze 2013; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Swers 2013; Tamerius 
1995; S. Thomas and Welch 1991). According to this model, therefore, the gender identity of 
a legislator is a meaningful indicator of one’s legislative priorities, and electing more women 
to the legislature will lead to more women-friendly laws proposed, if not passed.  
However, this model cannot explain why some men legislators support and propose 
bills on issues traditionally associated with women’s rights. Moreover, not all women 
legislators seem to identify themselves as “women’s representatives” and focus exclusively 
on women-friendly issues in their legislative agendas. Even though the gender identity of a 
legislator is the most powerful factor in influencing the sponsorship of women’s issue 
measures, legislators’ age and districts’ characteristics as well as legislative committee 
membership affect the total number of women-friendly bills introduced by each member 
(Barnello and Bratton 2007).  
Different from the descriptive representation model, the constituency model argues 
that lawmakers prioritize their legislative portfolios considering the prospects of re-election, 
thus variables such as preferences of districts they represent or their parties’ issue concerns 
determine their legislative behaviors (S. Carroll 2000; Grey 2006). However, women 
lawmakers’ actual legislative outcomes do not always match their stated interests in women’s 
issues, because other factors such as electoral rules, the culture of parliaments, and party 
affiliation influence legislative process (Celis et al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2006). Similarly, 
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Karen Celis and her coauthors (2008) stress differences between women and the 
contribution of men in putting forward women-friendly policies(Celis et al. 2008).  
From these insights, some researchers have examined how factors such as race or 
gender interact with partisanship and interests in re-election (Swers 2013). Also, voters 
assume that women candidates are better at handling “feminine issues” such as social 
security, welfare, or education, while male candidates are expected to be better at handling 
“masculine” issues such as crime, economic growth, security, or foreign affairs. In terms of 
political ideology, liberal parties are assumed to be more capable of handling these 
“feminine” issues, while conservative parties are considered to be apt to address “masculine” 
issue areas (Genovese 2013; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Sanbonmatsu 2002, 23; Swers 
2013; Murray 2010). These gender stereotypes interact with party stereotypes and affect 
voters’ evaluation of political candidates, not only in legislative elections but also in executive 
elections, and legislators are aware of these stereotypes.  
How legislators won their seats can also influence their legislative behaviors (Goetz 
2002; Rich 2012). The PR members and SMD members might have different interests even 
before getting elected, which might explain the different legislative foci after they are elected. 
Or, PR women might feel obligations to represent women because they are “beneficiaries” 
of gender quotas, or conversely the PR women may seek not to focus on women’s issues in 
order to avoid stigma (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012).   
Based on the existing literature, I examined how legislators’ gender identity, 
perceived gendered stereotypes on issue competencies, party issue ownership, legislative 
committee membership, and the seat type interact to determine legislative behaviors, 
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Research Design: Sequential Multi-Method Approach 
To answer the research questions, I took a two-phase, sequential multi-method approach. I 
began with a statistical analysis to test theories and concepts on the role of gender and 
political parties in the candidate nomination, election, and legislative activities. This was 
followed by qualitative research in the form of elite interviews, participant observation, and 
analysis of public documents such as newspaper articles and the bills proposed to the 
National Assembly. Through the qualitative analysis, I examined the relationship between 
the variables identified by the statistical analysis and flesh out the statistical findings 
(Creswell 2003, 15–16). Qualitative analysis helps to understand how actors in the events 
make sense of the situation and their experiences, and how these understandings influence 
their behaviors (Maxwell 2005, 22). More importantly, qualitative research following the 
statistical analysis revealed “how x plays a role in causing y, what the process is that connects x 
and y” (Maxwell 2005, 23).  
Using multi-method research design was a reasonable methodological decision which 
can maximize my research strengths. As a native Korean who was born and raised in the 
county of research, until completing the master’s level training, I have capabilities to make 
use of original resources in Korean language and to communicate effectively with potential 
participants in face-to-face interviews and/or focus group interviews. Also, I am familiar 
with the Korean culture and have personal connections with people who currently or 
formerly served or worked in the National Assembly and major political parties, as well as 
relevant research and academic institutions located in South Korea. These people helped me 
tremendously with establishing network with interviewees and locating resources, and this 
snowballed to recruit more interviewees.  
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All the relevant data on candidates’ background such as incumbency status, previous 
political experiences, sex, and party affiliation are available at the National Election 
Commission Online Database (Korean National Election Commission 2016). The list of 
candidates in each district, the vote shares of each candidate and the outcomes of the 13th – 
20th National Assembly elections are also available in the same database.  
 
Significance of the Study 
This research contributes to the literature on politics and gender, as well as providing policy 
insights as to increase political representation of political minorities. The existing literature 
argues that the most critical factor in numerical underrepresentation of women is not voters  
nor low political ambition of women, but political party elites’ discriminative nomination 
practices. I tested these theories on the South Korean context and my findings generally 
support the existing theory.  
This in-depth case provides a better understanding of both the formal and informal 
rules and the dynamics in the Korean case (on the importance of examining informal 
institutions, see Helmke and Levitsky 2004), but also whether these institutional 
arrangements yield its desirable/intended effects of promoting minorities’ political inclusion. 
The process of adopting voluntary party gender quotas was contentious, which has resulted 
in changes to parties’ rules on gender quotas with every election cycle. Attempts to adopt 
affirmative measures to nominate more women candidates in the nomination process have 
faced fierce objections from male party members (Hangyoreh Shinmun 2012a; Jeong 2012). 
Also, political parties’ compliance with the gender quotas provisions is critical for the gender 
quotas to have intended impacts of increasing descriptive representation of women. Existing 
studies, including those on South Korea, have demonstrated that political parties are 
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unwilling to recruit women to SMD seats, but more likely to compromise to promote 
women in PR seats (Jiso Yoon and Shin 2015).  
This study delves even deeper, by providing quantitative and qualitative empirical 
evidence, to demonstrate that the district assignment and nomination patterns of the major 
parties and the informal rules of political parties’ nomination process results in imposing 
challenges for women aspirants. By identifying factors which either promote or obstruct the 
election of more women to the national legislature, this study examines how successful 
gender quota has been in achieving its original goal of political empowerment of women, 
since its adoption in 2004.  
This case study reaches the broader scholarly audience by providing a rich analysis of 
a country for which original data is very limited. This study is unique in scope, as it examines 
all the candidates in the previous eight elections since the country’s democratization. Existing 
studies on South Korean national legislative elections analyzed one or two election cycles, 
not the all eight elections since democratization.  
Lastly, the findings of this study will provide insights to those interested in passing 
gender equality policies and laws. What is needed to promote women’s substantive 
representation? Will electing more women to the National Assembly guarantee the proposal 
and passage of more women friendly bills? Or does the influence of parties dictate the 
contents of bills proposed? Or, regardless of one’s gender, do legislators’ life experiences 
matter in forming legislators’ legislative priorities? Or, does the pressure from districts or 
interest groups exert the most important influence? The findings of this research will provide 
to those interested in the advancement of women friendly bills strategies of how, when and 
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The Roadmap of the Dissertation  
In Chapter 2, I test the existing theories on factors affecting women’s political 
representation using South Korea as a case study, where political parties are centralized and 
the mixed electoral system is used.1 Based on the statistical and interview analyses, I argue 
that gender quotas serve as a stepping stone to start one’s political career, especially for 
women, but the majority of PR members experience political career termination and 
interruption after serving four years as PR legislators.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss what explains this career interruption and termination for PR 
members based on the interviews with the former and current legislators and their staffers. 
The interviewees’ responses show high costs involved with establishing and maintaining 
local networks, and masculine way of local networking undermines the potential power 
women’s movement can play in empowering women. The unique culture of the National 
Assembly and major parties which consider SMD members to be more prestigious position 
than the PR members, and the political parties’ informal practice to place former PR 
members to run in less winnable seats greatly contribute to the majority of PR members’ 
career termination. This undermines the effectiveness of gender quotas in making long-term 
changes in the gender composition in the Assembly. This qualitative analysis fleshes out the 
statistical findings I examine in Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 4, I examine variables contributing to promoting women’s substantive 
representation, or policy responsiveness. Women legislators in South Korea have been as 
                                                     
1 As of 2017, 246 members are directly elected by voters in SMDs and 54 are selected through PR system using 
closed party-lists. The two-vote system -- voters cast one vote to the candidate of their preference and the 
other to the political party they support -- has been in effect since the 17th legislative election of 2004.  
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active as men legislators in terms of the number of bills they author, and the passage rate of 
bills written by women is only slightly lower than of men (Minjeoung Kim 2011, 121–27). 
However, women and men legislators have focused their legislative activities on different 
policy areas. Women legislators tend to propose bills related to public health, welfare, social 
security, and human rights, while men legislators focus their legislative portfolios on issues 
related to economic growth, environment, welfare, and the public administration reform 
(Minjeoung Kim 2011, 207). A closer look at the bills sponsorship activities presents an 
interesting picture. As Barnello and Bratton (2007) argued, “women are not uniformly 
destined to focus on women's issues, and men are not uniformly uninterested in these 
issues” (Barnello and Bratton 2007, 452). My own tracking of bill sponsorship activities in 
the 16th and the 18th Assemblies shows that the legislators who proposed the highest number 
of women friendly bills were male SMD members. This observation raises the core questions 
of this chapter: Which factors influence women’s policy responsiveness? More specifically, 
do perceived gender issue competencies and party issue ownership interact and affect 
lawmakers’ legislative portfolios? Who proposed women-friendly bills and why do they push 
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Chapter 2. The Leaky Pipeline and Sacrificial Lambs: Candidate Nomination and 
District Assignment in the National Legislative Elections, 1988-2016 
 
Introduction 
Gender equality has not grown in South Korea apace with the overall economic growth of 
the last three decades. As one measure of this, the Economist’s annual Glass-Ceiling Index 
rated South Korea 25.6 points out of 100 in 2015. This rating, which reflects equality in 
education, labor-force participation, politics, and business, is around 30 points lower than 
the United States, 35 points lower than the OECD average, and almost 55 points lower than 
Finland (the highest scoring nation in the world; Economist 2015). The gender composition of 
the National Assembly reflects this poor progress. Since the first female national legislator, 
Dr. Young-shin Yim, took her seat in 1949, the increase in the number of women in the 
National Assembly has been glacial, currently 17 percent and never surpassing 20 percent, 
much less reaching the world average of 22.7 percent as of July 2016 (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 2016). The average proportion of women in Asia’s national parliaments in lower and 
upper houses is 19.3 percent in the same period (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016).  
How does South Korea measure up with its democratic neighbors? The share of 
women members in Japanese lower house is 9.5 percent, and 15.7 percent of the upper 
house members are women (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). The Legislative Yuan in 
Taiwan, another democratic neighbor of South Korea, is represented by 33 percent of 
women legislators, which is much higher than the other two countries (The International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems 2016a). The level of political representation of women in 
Japan and South Korea is puzzling, as it does not seem to correspond to the countries’ levels 
of economic development or gender equality in other sectors in these societies. According to 
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a global ranking of the Gross Domestic Product in 2015 by Global Finance, Taiwan is the 19th 
richest country in the globe, followed by Japan, which is the 28th richest, and South Korea 
the 29th (Pasquali 2016). On the contrary, Japan was ranked 101st overall out of 145 countries 
in the Gender Gap Index in the World Economic Forum’s The Global Gender Gap Report 
2015, 88th in gender parity in economic participation and opportunity, 84th in gender parity in 
educational attainment, and 104th in terms of women’s political empowerment (World 
Economic Forum 2015, 9). South Korea was placed 115th in the overall index, 125th in 
economic participation and opportunity, 102nd in educational attainment, and 86th in terms of 
political empowerment (World Economic Forum 2015, 9).2  
Even though these three East Asian countries are economically developed and 
democratized, the level of women’s political representation varies. What explains this 
disparity? One might point to electoral institutions to explain this variation. Existing 
literature suggests that the electoral system is one of the most influential determinants of 
how many political minorities are elected. Countries with the PR system tend to have higher 
share of women in legislatures compared to those with the SMD system (Rule 1987, 1994; 
Salmond 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Tremblay 
2006).  
However, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have mixed electoral systems, where 
district-tier seats are elected through the plurality voting system, while the other officials are 
elected through the PR system. Japan’s Shugiin has 480 members, 300 of whom are elected 
in the SMDs through plurality votes, and 180 members are through the closed-list PR system 
(The International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2016b). Out of 113 total seats of the 
Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, 34 are elected through the party list PR votes, and the others are 
                                                     
2 Data on Taiwan are not available. 
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chosen to represent the SMD seats (The International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
2016a). South Korea has had a two-tier mixed electoral system (parallel system), with a 
district tier (SMD) and a nationwide closed-list PR. Since 2004, a 50 percent gender quota is 
applied to 54 PR seats out of 300 total legislative positions.3   
Japan does not have gender quotas for their legislative elections, whereas South 
Korea and Taiwan reserve 50 percent of the PR seats for women, which may explain Japan’s 
low level of women’s representation. In spite of the gender quotas, however, women’s share 
of national legislative seats in South Korea is lower than the Asian average. That is not the 
case with Taiwan. What can explain the puzzle of South Korea’s numerical 
underrepresentation of women in politics? Some empirical data including the World Values 
Surveys show that South Korean citizens still have persistent gender-stereotypical attitudes 
more so than Taiwanese. In 2010, 43.9 percent of South Korean respondents believed that 
men make better political leaders, while only 34.5 percent of Taiwanese respondents agreed 
with the statement in 2012 (World Values Survey 2015).4 The same survey shows that 41.9 
percent of South Korean respondents agreed that men make better business executive 
leaders, when only 25.5 percent of Taiwanese thought so (World Values Survey 2015).5  
However, this current study shows that the candidate’s gender is not a significant 
inhibiting factor of electoral victories for women, and the voters do not discriminate against 
female candidates. Rather, the analysis reveals that the practices of the political parties in 
candidate nomination and district assignments (especially for PR members), and the unique 
                                                     
3 One SMD seat was added to the existing 299 seats in 2012; the number of PR seats is reduced to 47 in 2016. 
A more detailed discussion of the quotas is presented in the following section.  
4 The WVS data show only 27.6 percent Japanese respondents agree with the statement; interestingly, however, 
35 percent of the respondents marked “Don’t Know,” a surprisingly high rate compared to 5.7 percent in 
Taiwan and 0.2 percent in South Korea. 
5 Again, a relatively low percentage of Japanese respondents (24.7 percent) agreed with the statement but 32.6 
percent of the respondents chose “Don’t Know.”  
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culture of the mixed electoral system, which favors the SMD members to the PR members, 
limits the spillover effect of gender quotas to the electoral victory in the district seats. Even 
though previous studies argue that former and current PR legislators are more likely to be 
successful in their bids in SMD seats (Shin 2014), this current study shows that an 
empowering effect of gender quota for PR tiers is limited to the candidate selection stage, as 
serving as PR members do not significantly increase the probabilities of winning district 
seats in the following election cycle. In spite of seemingly favorable political institutions of 
the mixed electoral system and gender quotas, informal and formal rules governing the 
practices of candidate nomination, elections, and workings of the parties and the Assembly 
pose invisible barriers to women. This contributes to career interruptions/termination of PR 
women, limiting the potential positive effects of gender quotas and the mixed system on 
promoting women’s numerical representation in the National Assembly.  
Improving the gender parity of  the elected offices is important because having more 
women in legislatures leads to policies that are responsive to women’s issues (Bratton and 
Ray 2002; Caiazza 2004; Childs 2002; Crowley 2004; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008; 
Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Schulze 2013; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Swers 2013). 
Moreover, as Rainbow Murray argues, “male overrepresentation itself  compromises 
meritocracy and constrains the substantive representation of  men as well as women” 
(Murray 2014, 1). Historically, moreover, the increase in South Korean women legislators has 
resulted in diversifying legislative committee assignments for the female members, which, in 
turn, led to women’s input in the legislative process in a wider variety of  sectors (W.-H. Kim 
2011, 42–43). Finally, citizens in countries with high levels of  women’s political 
representation show higher levels of  satisfaction with the ways in which their democracies 
operate and believe that their elections reflect the voters’ views (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; 
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Karp and Banducci 2008; Wolak 2014). Karp and Banducci (2008) demonstrated that both 
men and women in countries with high level of  women’s political representation evince 
higher levels of  satisfaction with the way democracy works in their own country and agree 
elections reflect the view of  voters (Karp and Banducci 2008). Even though Karp and 
Banducci do not discuss the specific case of  Korea, their results show that Korean women 
are less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works in their own country and less 
likely to believe that parties and leaders reflect their views, compared to their male 
counterparts (Karp and Banducci 2008). Thus having answers to these questions is 
important. 
This study’s findings suggest that the spillover effect is smaller than expected. It 
shows that experience serving as PR members or as local legislators has no significant effect 
on electoral success for SMD seats. The small share of PR seats in the national legislature 
and the centralized party nomination process reveal the limitations of the PR system and 
gender quotas as tools to support the empowerment of women, which many scholars have 
hailed as a fast-track remedy to address women’s underrepresentation in legislatures. This 
study suggests that in South Korea, other factors including major parties’ nomination and 
running in the candidate’s party stronghold correlate more strongly with electoral success 
and could produce greater gender parity in the legislature. This implies that “leveling the 
playing field” through these two measures leaves women as electorally competitive as male 
candidates, but that their parties continue to fail to nominate them in stronghold districts. 
The first part of this chapter outlines South Korea’s electoral system. The second 
addresses the findings of existing literature on the issue of electing women to the legislatures. 
Based on the extant literature, I propose research hypotheses, and then report the data and 
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the statistical method I utilized to test the hypotheses. The last section discusses findings on 
the effects of factors related to the district assignment process and the elections. 
 
Background: Gender Quotas of South Korea 
Until the 17th legislative election in 2004, the PR seats were distributed among the parties 
according to the proportion of votes a party had won through all of its candidates. In 2001, 
the Constitutional Court ruled this process unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court ruled 
that counting a vote twice, one as a support for a district candidate and again for a party for 
PR election, does not accurately reflect the intention of the voters who support either a party 
or a candidate. It was determined that such voters have no means to express their support 
for these separate entities. In addition, votes cast for independent district candidates could 
not be counted for party preferences, and as a result, the votes for independent candidates 
were not counted in the PR election. Lastly, the system disproportionately favored major 
parties and discriminated against minor or new parties. It prevented minor or new parties 
from getting seats because these minority parties generally attracted little support for their 
district candidates (National Law Information Center 2001).  
Following the Court’s ruling, the National Assembly passed a new election law 
mandating a two-ballot system in 2004. The same law stipulates a mandatory 50 percent 
gender quota, applicable to 54 PR seats out of 299 total legislative positions (one SMD seat 
was added in 2012). The measure mandates a zipper system, alternating women and men in 
the closed party list. The ruling Saenuri Party and the main opposition Democratic Party 
place women candidates in the odd number positions (Korean National Election 
Commission 2015; see Shin 2014 and Yoon and Shin 2015 for detailed discussions on the 
gender quotas adoption in South Korea and the role of women's movements in the process). 
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The gender quotas for PR seats showed an immediate effect: the number of PR women 
legislators increased from 11 in the 2000 National Assembly election to 29 in the 2004 
National Assembly election. Out of the 178 women who have been elected to the National 
Assembly from 2004 to 2016, 109 of them have been elected to PR seats. Political party rules 
stipulate that PR members cannot serve in this capacity for more than one term, however. 
Those who were once elected and served at the PR tier should subsequently seek election as 
SMD members if they desire to continue their legislative careers. However, the share of 
SMD women remained lower than 10 percent of the total SMD seats until it rose above that 
percentage point in 2016 (see Table 2.1.).  
 
Table 2.1. The Share of Women Legislators in the National Assemblies, 1948-2016 










1st (1948) 200 1 (0.5%)     
2nd (1950) 210 2 (0.9%)     
3rd (1954) 203 1 (0.5%)     
4th (1958) 233 1 (1.3%)     
5th (1960) 233 1 (0.4%)     
6th (1963) 175 2 (1.1%) 131 1 (0.7%) 44 1 (2.3%) 
7th (1967) 175 3 (1.7%) 131 1 (0.7%) 44 2 (4.5%) 
8th (1971) 204 5 (2.5%) 153 0 (0%) 51 5 (9.8%) 
9th (1973) 219 13 (5.5%) 146 2 (1.4%) 73 10 (13.7%) 
10th (1978) 231 8 (3.5%) 154 1 (0.6%) 77 7 (9.1%) 
11th (1981) 276 9 (3.3%) 184 1 (0.5%) 92 8 (8.7%) 
12th (1985) 276 8 (2.9%) 184 2 (1.1%) 92 6 (6.5%) 
13th (1988) 299 6 (2%) 224 0 (0%) 75 6 (8%) 
14th (1992) 299 8 (2.7%) 237 1 (0.4%) 62 7 (11.3%) 
15th (1996) 299 11 (3.7%) 253 3 (1.2%) 46 8 (17.4%) 
16th (2000) 273 16 (5.9%) 227 5 (2.2%) 46 11 (23.9%) 
17th (2004) 299 39 (13%) 243 10 (4.1%) 56 29 (51.8%) 
18th (2008) 299 41 (13.7%) 245 14 (5.7%) 54 27 (50%) 
19th (2012) 300 47 (15.7%) 246 19 (7.7%) 54 28 (51.9%) 
20th (2016) 300 51 (17%) 253 26 (10.2%) 47 25 (53.2%) 
Source: Kim 2012, 124 and NEC database 
 
The two major parties have adopted 30 percent “voluntary” candidate party quotas for 
SMDs, but they have not been proactive in nominating women (Jiso Yoon and Shin 2015). 
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The conservative Saenuri Party, which secured 154 seats out of 300 seats in the 19th 
legislative election and 122 seats in the 20th election, pledged that 30 percent of its SMD 
candidates would be women before the election but ended up nominating a group of 
candidates that was only 7 percent women in the 19th and 6.5 percent in the 20th election. 
The central-left Democratic Party, which secured 127 out of 300 seats in the 19th elections 
and 123 seats in the 20th elections (and its faction created another party, the People Party, 
and earned 175 seats), also nominated only 15 percent of its SMD-nominated candidates 
with women in the 19th election, and 10.7 percent in the 20th election (Kim 2012, 60).  
 
Table 2.2. Number of Primary Candidates, Nominated, and the Elected for the 
National Assembly Elections, 2008-2016 
 
Men Women 
Applied Nominated Elected Applied Nominated Elected 
Saenuri       

























      
























Source: Hangyoreh Shinmun 2008, 2012b; Korean National Election Commission 2016; Kyonghyang Shinmun 
2012; The Seoul Post 2008; Women News 2016.  
 
Lee and Shin (2016) attribute the limited impact of the voluntary party quotas to a 
low level of party institutionalization, which promotes clientelism as well as the centralized 
party organization (Hyunji Lee and Shin 2016). Women’s success rates vary according to 
party lines, both in the nomination process and the election stage (Table 2.2.). The women 
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of the conservative Saenuri Party are less likely to be nominated and elected than their male 
counterparts in the 2012 and the 2016 elections. The Democratic women have shown a 
higher level of success rate in the last two elections, and this is true of both the candidate 
selection and the election stages.  
However, far fewer women applied for the candidate nomination as compared to 
men in both major parties. The Saenuri Party accepted 1160 applications for candidate 
nominations in 2008, and only 50 of them were women. In the end, 18 women were 
nominated by the party.6 Among these individuals, 10 women won district elections. In 2012, 
972 applicants for the district elections included only 67 female applicants; 16 of them won 
nominations and 4 won elections (Korean National Election Commission 2016). In the 2016 
election, 78 out of 822 applicants are women, 16 women secured the nomination, and 6 won 
the election (Table 2.2.).  
Similarly, 21 women applied for candidate nomination in 2008 to the central-left 
Democratic Party. Among them and others, 15 women won nominations and four 
eventually won the elections. In the following election, 48 out of 713 applicants were 
women, 21 women won nominations, and 13 were eventually elected (Korean National 
Election Commission 2016). In the 2016 election, 35 women were among 369 applicants, 25 
won the party’s nomination and 17 finally won the district elections (Table 2.2.).   
Comparing the progress rate by gender (from the application to nomination, and 
from nomination to election, Table 2.2.), women’s success rate is not significantly lower than 
that of men, and even higher than men’s in each stage. This means women are as 
                                                     
6 This number includes those who did not apply to be nominated, but were recruited and nominated by the 
party elites for strategic reasons. 
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competitive as men in the nomination and election stage, but only few throw their hats into 
the ring (similar to Lawless and Fox 2010). Also, it could mean only women who are 
“qualified” and have good shots at winning come forward.  
 
Theories of Women’s Political Representation and Hypothesis 
District Assignment: Party Loyalty and Incumbent Advantage  
 
Running in a district with strong partisan support for a candidate’s party is as important as 
winning a major party’s nomination, and both incumbency and prior political experience give 
candidates significant advantages (Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Palmer and Simon 2006; 
Schwindt-Bayer 2005; Studlar and McAllister 1991). In this research, I examine two aspects 
of district assignments: running as incumbents of the district or in open seats, and the level 
of party support of the district.  
The effect of incumbency advantage on voting decisions is stronger than sharing 
gender identity with the candidate: although women voters feel close to female candidates, 
they ultimately make voting decisions on the basis of incumbency or political experience as 
well as party affiliation of the candidates (Dolan 2008, 87). Each party’s candidate 
nomination process and the party’s organization affect nomination outcomes, both in terms 
of whether women win nominations as well as where they run (Lovenduski 1993; Luhiste 
2015). The bias of the party elite and ensuing discriminatory district assignments for women 
are more critical than voters’ bias in determining the electoral outcomes (Murray, Krook, and 
Opello 2012). 
Many women candidates worldwide are political novices when they run for office. As 
a result, few of them enjoy an incumbency advantage; even worse, they often run as 
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challengers against the districts’ incumbents rather than vying for open seats (Bernstein 
1986, Burrell 1992, Niven 2006). What makes the election more difficult for women is that 
those who fought hard to secure a major party’s nomination often end up running as 
challengers against the districts’ incumbents. Robert A. Bernstein’s research on U.S. House 
races from 1974 to 1984 finds that the number of women candidates tripled but they were 
less likely to win primaries for open seats, thus eventually only a few women were elected 
(Bernstein 1986; also Burrell 1992).  
Studies based on the European countries and Canada showed that women 
candidates usually run in districts where the level of support for their parties is low, making 
them the “sacrificial lambs” (Luhiste 2015; Thomas and Bodet 2013). Even when women 
run as incumbents, a study on Canadian elections finds, only 21 percent of women competed 
in their own party’s strongholds, whereas 79 percent male incumbents ran in their party’s 
strongholds (M. Thomas and Bodet 2013). Nevertheless, when women are placed to run as 
incumbents or to be elected for open seats, women are more likely to win than men (Fox 
and Oxley 2003).  
Studies focusing on South Korean elections find similar dynamics of candidate 
nomination by political parties and suggest that women are at a disadvantage in this pre-
election process (Chin 2004; Kim 2012; Yoo 2012; Yoon 2012). Incumbents are more likely 
to be exposed to media coverage, and their participation in their districts creates a close 
rapport with local voters (Hwang 1998). However, South Korean voters prioritize political 
experience and incumbency of candidates over their gender. One survey finds, 35.4 percent 
of respondents said they voted for the women candidates because the candidates had already 
served in the same district. Conversely, 32.4 percent of the respondents stated that the most 
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salient reason for not supporting female candidates was their lack of political experience 
(Kim, Kim, and Kim 2002, 42). 
However, few studies of Korea have tested the effect of district assignment on 
electoral outcomes empirically, and this study fills this gap. Existing studies of South Korean 
elections have used “regional cleavage” as a proxy to gauge party loyalty of a district, 
assuming that all the districts in a province share the same party loyalty. However, this 
coding scheme has limitations: even districts in the same city or the same province display 
mixed party preferences. Based on the two ballot system used since 2004, this study uses 
party ballot results at the district level to gauge a district’s party loyalty.  
Based on the existing literature, I hypothesize the following:  
- H1: The association of running in a party stronghold and winning an SMD election 
is equally strong and positive as the association between winning a major party’s 
nomination and an electoral victory. 
- H2: Female candidates are likely to be assigned to run for less winnable seats.  
 
Previous Political Experience: Spillover Effect of PR and Local Political Experience  
 
Having political experience is just as important as winning a nomination from a major party 
in determining electoral outcomes, and it also increases the chances of getting a nomination 
(Hwang 2006; Kim and Kim 2012; Seo 2004). In contrast with the “sacrificial lamb” model, 
which focuses on discriminatory candidate assignment and nomination practices, the 
proponents of the “pipeline model” argue that the low level of women’s political 
representation results from a limited pool of qualified candidates (Stambough and O’Regan 
2007). The latter model posits that as more and more women attain political experience at 
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the lower level of political offices, more female candidates will be elected to the higher-level 
offices.  
However, the existing literature draws different conclusions on women’s level of 
political experience prior to running for office. In the U.S. state legislative races, women 
candidates are more qualified than their male counterparts (Carroll 2009); Rainbow Murray 
showed, however, that French women on average had less political experience, but “men are 
still being selected in higher numbers than women when they have no experience at all or 
very little…the majority of deputies with little or no prior experience in politics are male” 
(Murray 2012, 35).  
Echoing the pipeline model, O’Brien and Rickne (2016) demonstrate that quotas 
increase the pool of female party members who are perceived as qualified for party 
leadership positions (O’Brien and Rickne 2016). Some studies show that gender quotas have 
a positive effect on promoting women’s political representation over time. Gender quotas for 
PR seats in South Korea have a spillover effect on electing women to SMD seats and “a 
prolonged impact on women’s sustainable representation” (Shin 2014, 80) because former 
and current PR legislators are more likely to be successful in their bids for SMD seats. 
Davidson-Schmich also suggests a spillover effect of PR gender quotas to SMD elections in 
South Korea, based on her examination of the 2013 Bundestag election in Germany, another 
country with the mixed electoral system. Her study, however, has not empirically tested the 
assumption (Davidson-Schmich 2014).  
When reviewing the South Korean candidates’ background, however, it becomes 
evident that PR women were not highly successful in their SMD bids. Shin’s work (2014) 
establishes a spillover effect on candidate nomination, but not on electoral results. I 
reviewed the success rate of PR women on their SMD bids, and found only 33 PR women 
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ran for the 17th Assembly elections in 2004, including those who succeeded when their 
predecessors could not finish their terms. According to the roster of the national legislators, 
only five women legislators out of fourteen who were elected to the 18th Assembly (2008) 
served as PR members in the 17th Assembly (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 
2012, 2014). In the 20th elections in 2016, only three out of 26 women who won the 20th 
SMD elections were the PR members of the 19th Assembly. As this current study shows, 
only 25 percent of the women elected in the eight elections since 1988 (that is, 19 out of 76 
women elected) have had previous PR experience. Contrary to the existing literature, 
therefore, I hypothesize that the magnitude of the spillover effect of PR gender quotas on 
the electoral success at the national level is weaker than expected. This hypothesis supports 
the sacrificial lamb model, rather than the pipeline model. As per Timothy Rich (2012), 
South Korea (as well as Japan and Taiwan) has an invisible hierarchy between SMD and PR 
members, with the former deemed more prestigious and more legitimate because SMDs are 
directly elected by the voters (Rich 2012). Also, PR members are implicitly discouraged from 
applying for leadership positions in the Assembly and discriminated against in legislative 
committee assignment (Kim, Lee, and Jo 2014).  
My analysis also examines the effect of local political experience on winning the 
national SMD elections, another test for the pipeline model. Gender quotas for local elected 
offices have encouraged political parties to nominate more women for local elections, and 
the pool of candidates has broadened as the number of qualified candidates increased. Since 
the enactment of mandatory gender quotas for local elections in 2010, the number of 
women candidates nominated and elected for local offices at the province, city, and county 
level has increased. In 2006, 298 women won party nominations and as many as 483 female 
candidates did in 2010 (Jo and Park 2011, 14). In 2006, 3026 men and 142 women were 
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elected to legislative offices, in comparison to 2863 men and 329 women in 2010 (Korean 
National Election Commission 2016). Given these broad trends, I expect the expanded pool 
of women who have local political experience to increase the number of female candidates 
running for the national-level elections. If the spillover effect emerges, then serving at the 
local level may increase women’s electoral competitiveness in national legislative elections. 
- H3: Serving as PR members does not significantly increase the predicted 
probabilities of winning SMD elections. 
- H4: Serving at the local political offices increases the predicted probabilities of 
winning SMD elections. 
 
Effect of Candidate’s Gender and Gender Stereotypes on Electoral Outcomes 
 
Existing literature provides empirical evidence that a candidate’s gender shapes how voters 
perceive candidates. Voters use the candidate’s gender to infer his or her ideological 
orientations or competent issue areas (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000). Extant 
studies offer contrasting diagnoses of how voters’ gendered perceptions translate into their 
voting decisions. Some scholars argue that gender stereotypes work in women candidates’ 
favor (Black and Erickson 2003) and female candidates’ strategic emphasis on women’s 
issues during their campaigns contributes to their electoral success (Herrnson, Lay, and 
Stokes 2003). Some have demonstrated a gender affinity effect – women voters are more 
likely to vote for women candidates, sometimes even crossing the party line (Simon and 
Hoyt 2008). On average, however, voters are less likely to vote for women and use higher 
standards when assessing women’s qualifications (Barbara Lee Family Foundation 2012), 
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assuming that women are less viable (Carlin and Winfrey 2009; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; 
Koch 2000; Kropf and Boiney 2001).  
Other empirical studies show that gender is not the most influential factor in voters’ 
minds (Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Even 
when voters link women and men with different attributes and strengths or weaknesses, this 
judgment may not translate into choosing male candidates over female ones (Alexander and 
Anderson 1993; McElroy and Marsh 2010). Female candidates’ party affiliation determines 
electoral outcomes to a far greater extent than gender stereotypes do (Dolan 2013). The 
effect of gender in elections is context-specific, depending on factors such as the political 
background of the opponent and the salient policy issues dominating the debates of the 
specific political campaign (Sanbonmatsu 2002).  
Political party gatekeepers are unwilling to nominate women and place them in 
winnable districts (Cheng and Tavits 2011; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Murray, Krook, and 
Opello 2012; Niven 1998, 2006), which is more critical than voter’s bias against women or 
gender gap in political ambition. While gender stereotypes affect the candidate nomination 
stage adversely, once a woman is nominated, her likelihood of success is as high as men, 
controlling for other factors (Fox and Oxley 2003). Other district-level factors, such as major 
parties’ nomination, incumbency status and open-seat races and running in a district with a 
high level of party loyalty to his or her party are more consequential to the electoral victory 
than the candidates’ gender. Based on the literature, I test the following hypothesis:  
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Data and Research Design  
I test my hypotheses through the two stages of statistical analysis. First, I analyze the 
background of all candidates who ran for district elections from 1988 to 2016 to see if a 
gender gap exists in candidates’ political experience, the political parties’ candidate 
nomination, and district assignment patterns. Data used for this descriptive analysis includes 
the electoral outcomes of the district elections, the candidates’ political experience prior to 
the elections, educational level, and age. This data has been collected from the National 
Election Commission of South Korea and national legislators’ roster on the Republic of 
Korean Parliamentary database (Korean National Election Commission 2016; Republic of 
Korea Parliamentarian Society 2015). The data set includes 8629 candidates. I compared 
women’s and men’s party affiliations (major party candidate, minor party candidate, 
independents), the type of the competition (incumbent, challenger, open-seat), and the level 
of party loyalty of the district. All of these factors were compared along the gender line. 
In the second stage of analysis, I compare the impact of the districts’ characteristics 
and the candidates’ political experience on whether the candidates won or lost the elections, 
using two logistic regression models. In both of the models, I examined the effects of the 
following factors: running with a major party nomination, running as an incumbent of the 
district, an open seat race, the status of a former or current PR member, and the status of a 
former or current local politician. For this statistical analysis, I narrowed the scope down to 
the top two contenders of the district elections, since coding one of the control variables, 
male advantage, requires confining the analysis to the top two contenders. In total, 3854 
candidates’ electoral outcomes from the 13th to the 20th elections (1988 – 2016) were 
included in the first model.  
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The majority of individuals who became top two candidates (82 percent) were 
affiliated with the major parties (measured by a dummy major party). Thirty-one percent of 
the candidates ran as the incumbents of a district who sought reelection (a dummy variable 
incumbent), while 34 percent of the candidates competed in the districts where the incumbent 
was not running (open-seat). Approximately eight percent of the top two candidates’ highest 
level of political experience was at the local level, either in an elected or appointed office, as 
measured by a dummy variable former or current local politician. Approximately five percent of 
the candidates’ highest level of political office assumed is a national PR seat (former or current 
PR member). Those who have both PR and SMD experience were coded as having SMD 
experience (Table 2.3).  
For the second logistic model, I added a dummy variable, running in his or her party’s 
stronghold, which is measured by the relative share of two major parties’ PR votes in the 
district. The current study uses these party ballot results at the district level to assess a 
district’s party loyalty.7 Since the first competition using the two-ballot system took place 
during the 2004 election, this model can only be applied to the candidates who ranked the 
top two of each district from the 17th – 20th elections (2004 – 2016). When the share of PR 
                                                     
7 Previous studies have used “regional cleavage” as a proxy to assess the level of party loyalty of a district, 
assuming that all the districts in a province share the same level of party loyalty. However, even districts in the 
same city or in the same province show mixed party preferences, therefore the PR vote share is a better 
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votes cast for the Democratic Party in a district is over 20 percentage point higher than that 
of the Saenuri Party, the district is pro-Democratic, and vice versa. The Democratic 
candidates running in the pro-Democratic districts and the Saenuri candidates running in the 
pro-Saenuri districts are considered to run in “favorable districts.” Approximately a quarter of 
the top two candidates run in their party’s strongholds (measured by a dummy variable party’s 
stronghold).  
I included two control variables in the model. Based on Fréchette, Maniquet and 
Morelli (2008), I generated a category variable, male advantage, indicating the opponent’s 
gender running in the same district. A male candidate competing against a female contender 
is assigned the value of 1, while a female candidate running against a male candidate or a 
candidate running against the same sex contender is assigned the value of zero. Thirty-eight 
percent of the candidates were coded as having the male advantage. Another control variable 
measures a candidate’s sex (a dummy variable female). Only four percent of the 3854 
candidates were female. The female and the male advantage variables have a low level of 
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Table 2.3. Summary of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Obs. Mea
n 
S.D. Min. Max. Note 
Winner 3854 0.50 0.50 0 1 1: Winner of the district election, 0: 
Otherwise 
Major party 3854 0.82 0.38 0 1 1: Major party candidate;  
0: Minor party or independent candidate 
Incumbent 3854 0.31 0.46 0 1 1: Running as a SMD incumbent of the 
district;  
0: Otherwise 
Open seat 3854 0.34 0.47 0 1 1: Running in a district where the incumbent 




3854 0.08 0.28 0 1 1: Formerly or currently holding local 
legislative or executive offices at the timing of 
elections, excluding those who were elected 
to the Assembly seats after serving in a local 




3854 0.05 0.21 0 1 1: Former or current PR member at the 
timing of elections, excluding those who have 




1970 0.26 0.44 0 1 1: Running in his/her party’s stronghold 
0: Otherwise 
Female 3854 0.04 0.21 0 1 1: Female, 0: Male 




Findings and Discussions  
Descriptive Statistics: Gender Gap in Candidates’ Personal Background and District 
Assignment  
Table 2.4. presents a summary of the candidates’ personal backgrounds, as well as the 
pattern of district assignments and candidate nomination of the 8629 candidates and 1978 
legislators in the 13th – 20th Assembly elections. Through these eight legislative elections, 
1852 men and 76 women won the SMD contests, which do not count by-elections. Male 
candidates were more likely to run as major party candidates and as independents than 
women were. Among these major party candidates, only approximately four percent or 178 
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candidates were women. About 20 percent of all candidates ran as independent candidates, 
and only 51 women have done so since 1988.  
However, among the 1928 legislators who won the elections, the gender gap in party 
affiliations is not statistically significant. Regardless of gender, those with major party 
affiliations were likely to win (1706 out of 1928 winners, or 51 percent). Winning as minor 
party candidates or independents was uncommon, especially for women: only three women 
won with a minor party ticket and one woman did as an independent (Table 2.4.). My 
analysis suggests that when it comes to winning an SMD election, the gender of the 


















Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.39 
 
Table 2.4. Gender Gaps in Candidates’ and Legislators’ Backgrounds 
 
All candidates (1988-2016) SMD winner (1988-2016) 
 










8629 8185 444 
 




       
Major party  4383 4205 178 4.64 1706 1634 72 -1.74 
Minor party  2593 2378 215 -8.71 125 122 3 0.92 
Independent 1653 1602 51 4.22 97 96 1 1.51 
Political  
Experience 
       
Former and current SMD 1850 1797 53 5.02 983 949 34 1.11 
Former and current PR 238 193 45 -9.8 81 62 19 -9.43 
Local political office 668 627 41 -1.21 134 134 0 2.43 
District  
Characteristics 
       
Incumbent 1301 1258 43 3.26 816 788 28 0.98 
Challenger 4360 4110 250 -2.50 458 438 20 -0.53 
Open seat 2967 2816 151 0.17 654 626 28 -0.55 
Party stronghold 






40/355 2.23 390/986 362 28 -0.28 
Personal  
Characteristics 
       






























*Two-tailed t-test of men-women, reporting a p value.  
**Regarding the highest degree obtained, those with post-graduate degree is 3, college graduate/some college is 
2, high school diploma is 1, and less than high school is coded as 0.  
 
Candidates’ political experience prior to running for the national elections shows 
gender gaps (Table 2.4.). About 21.44 percent of all candidates (1850 out of 8629 candidates) 
had SMD experience at the time of their SMD bid. The share of male candidates with 
previous SMD experience (1797 out of 8185 candidates, or 24 percent) is higher than that of 
female candidates (53 out of 444 candidates, or 12 percent), a statistically significant 
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difference. On the other hand, only approximately three percent of all candidates had served 
or were serving as PR members (238 out of 8629 candidates) at the time of election, which is 
partly due to the fact that less than 20 percent of all available legislative seats are PR seats. 
The numbers suggest that women candidates used PR experience as a stepping-stone to the 
SMD candidacy more frequently than male candidates did: less than three percent of all male 
candidates (193 out of 8185 men) had served as PR members, while ten percent of women 
candidates (45 out of 444 women) were former and current PR members. The difference is 
substantively and statistically significant. This finding supports Shin’s (2014) argument that a 
gender quota for PR seats has a spillover effect on the number of women chosen as SMD 
candidates.  
When analyzing electoral victories, however, it becomes evident that the effect of PR 
experience on elections is limited. In the examination of all SMD winners in all eight 
elections, four percent of the winners had experience in PR seats (81 out of 1928). 
Approximately 25 percent of women who won district elections had PR experience (19 out 
of 76 female winners), while only three percent of male SMD legislators had it (62 out of 
1852 male winners, Table 2.4). In the last four elections, when the gender quotas were in 
effect, 25 percent of all female SMD winners (18 out of 68) were former or current PR 
members, while as many as 75 percent of women could win without PR experience (50 out 
of 68). In contrast, 51 percent of the winners between 1988 and 2016 have had SMD 
experience (983 out of 1928 winners). A higher percentage of male legislators versus female 
legislators had SMD experience, yet the difference between the groups is not statistically 
significant.  
Comparing the candidates’ success rate by gender, 53 percent of male candidates 
with SMD experience won an election (949 out of 1797 male candidates), and approximately 
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64 percent of women candidates with SMD experience won (34 out of 53 female 
candidates). Only approximately seven percent of the winners have served in local offices 
(134 out of 1928 winners). None of the elected women whose highest level of political 
experience was at the local level won an SMD bid. This suggests that SMD experience 
boosts electability regardless of gender. In summary, although PR experience can lead to 
SMD candidacy for women, SMD experience creates a greater likelihood to score an electoral 
victory in an SMD bid than PR experience or local political experience. 
Similarly, the pattern of electoral success in district assignments reveals a gender gap. 
The majority of all 8629 candidates were challengers running against the incumbents of the 
districts (4360 out of 8629 candidates), while 15 percent of the candidates were incumbents 
seeking reelection in their own districts (1301 out of 8629 candidates). Thirty-four percent of 
the candidates competed for open seats. Fifteen percent of all male candidates (1258 out of 
8185) and approximately ten percent of the female candidates (43 out of 444) were assigned 
to run as incumbents seeking reelection in their own districts, showing a statistically 
significant difference. Women were more likely to run as challengers than men: 56 percent 
and 50 percent respectively, also a statistically significant difference. However, the success 
rate for women incumbents is as high as that of men: 65 percent of female incumbents won 
the election (28 out of 43), and 63 percent of the male incumbents won the election (788 out 
of 1258). The difference is substantively and statistically not significant. These findings 
suggest that with favorable district assignments, women are as electorally competitive as 
men.  
Another aspect of district assignment, a district’s party loyalty, underscores the 
importance of political parties’ gatekeeping roles in determining electoral outcomes. As 
articulated in the previous section, the data for this variable have only become available after 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.42 
 
the electoral law reform in 2004. Merely 11 percent of women candidates in these last four 
elections ran in their party’s strongholds (40 out of 355 women candidates), as compared to 
16 percent of men (591 out of 3756), which is a statistically significant difference. Comparing 
the success rate, 70 percent of  women candidates running in their stronghold won the 
election (28 out of  40 female candidates) and 61 percent of  men running in their stronghold 
won the election (362 winners out of  591 candidates), and that difference is not statistically 
significant. The analysis of  the data demonstrates, once again, that a candidate’s gender is 
less consequential in electoral outcomes than the strategic district assignment by the political 
parties (Table 2.4.).  
Age and educational levels are similar for male and female candidates (Table 2.4.). 
Women are about five years younger than male candidates on average, but no gender age gap 
surfaces among the elected SMD members (52.33 for women and 53.4 for men). In general, 
the male candidates’ educational level is slightly higher than women’s (i.e., higher than a 
bachelor’s degree for both genders), and elected women’s overall educational attainment is 
slightly higher than men’s, but with a negligible difference. Given the approximate parity in 
the candidates’ educational level, I did not include this variable in the logistic regression 
models constructed in the second stage of  analysis.  
To sum up, gender gaps surface in the political and personal backgrounds of the 
candidates in the previous eight elections, which explains the low level of women’s 
representation in the National Assembly. Compared to men, women candidates have been 
less likely to serve as SMD members. PR experience was a more popular pathway to SMD 
candidacies for women, in part because there were more PR women than SMD women. Yet 
the likelihood of getting elected with PR experience is lower than running with prior SMD 
experience. Both major parties nominated few women. When nominating, they assigned 
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female candidates to districts where they were less likely to win and/or as challengers 
running against the districts’ incumbents. A vicious cycle is in place for women’s political 
recruitment. The probability of electoral victories for women has been small because of 
existing patterns of major parties’ nomination. In turn, when women lost, their electoral 
defeats were likely to make political parties more cautious about nominating female 
candidates in the future.  
 
Findings from Logistic Analysis  
After analyzing the descriptive statistics of the candidates’ personal backgrounds and the 
characteristics of the districts from which they seek election, I ran two logistic models to 
examine the magnitude and direction of each factor’s influence, controlling for other 
variables. For the regression analysis, I included only the top two contenders in each district, 
because one of the key factors, inter-gender competition (“male advantage”), requires 
confining the analysis to the top two contenders. In addition, the district election reflects the 
dominant two-party system, which usually makes only one or two candidates viable for the 
position. Thus, the various regressors’ influence on the 3854 candidates’ electoral outcomes 
from the 13th to the 20th elections is analyzed using the first model. The second model 
includes a variable of running in the party’s stronghold (or a favorable district), which is 
measured by the share of each party’s PR votes in a district. Because this two-vote system 
has only been implemented since the 17th election, I ran the second model including the 
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Table 2.5. The Impact of District-Related and Personal Factors on Electoral Success 
DV: Winning in the SMD 
Election 
13th -20th Elections 17th -20th Elections 
Estimate S.E. p-value Estimate S.E. p-value 
Major Party Candidate 0.69* 0.09 7.45 0.60* 0.15 3.97 
Incumbent 1.4* 0.09 15.98 1.69* 0.13 12.99 
Open Seat 0.63* 0.08 7.81 0.73* 0.12 6.08 
PR experience 0.16 0.16 0.99 0.36 0.27 1.35 
Local experience 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.81 
Running in Stronghold 
   
1.26* 0.13 10.12 
Female -0.21 0.17 -1.25 -0.11 0.20 -0.54 
Male Advantage 0.16 0.18 0.89 0.10 0.21 0.50 





Log likelihood  -2479.6   -1161.93   
Pseudo R2  0.07   0.15 
  
 
Notes: Estimates are logistic regression coefficients. * Significant at p<0.05 
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Figure 2.1. The Impact of District-Related and Personal Factors on Electoral Success 
 
The findings in Table 2.5. and Figure 2.1. demonstrate the crucial role political 
parties play in the electoral victory. Table 2.5. compares the results of the first and the 
second models. The first model, which includes all eight SMD elections, shows that running 
as an incumbent has a statistically significant and positive correlation with the predicted 
probabilities of winning the district election, as compared to when running as a challenger. 
Running with a major party’s ticket and running in a district where incumbents do not seek 
reelection also have positive correlations to the electoral victory (Table 2.5. and Figure 2.1.).  
The second regression model shows that the largest positive impact on the electoral 
victories over the course of the last four elections relates to running as an incumbent of the 
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which reinforces the importance of strategic district assignments (Table 2.5.). Two other 
matters also increase the predicted probability of winning the district election: running for 
open seats and securing a major party’s nomination (Table 2.5.). However, serving as a PR 
member or at the local office does not have substantive and statistically positive effect on 
winning the electoral bid for the district seats. The two controlling variables, the candidate’s 
sex and the opponent’s sex, are in the expected direction but not statistically significant 
(Table 2.5.).8  
This supports Murray, Krook and Opello’s (2012) findings that candidate assignment 
is more important than the candidate’s gender in the electoral outcomes. The major reason 
for women’s numerical underrepresentation is not voters’ bias against women but the party 
elite’s bias. The small share of PR seats in the Korean legislature and the centralized party 
nomination process should limit the positive effect of PR system and the gender quotas on 
increasing the share of women elected, which many scholars have hailed as a fast-track 
remedy to address women’s underrepresentation in legislatures. Second, according to Rich 
(2012), the South Korean Assembly’s mixed system creates an invisible hierarchy of SMD 
and PR members, in which the former deemed more prestigious and more legitimate, as the 
SMD members are directly elected by the voters (Rich 2012). In addition, PR members are 
implicitly discouraged from applying for leadership positions in the Assembly and 




                                                     
8 I also tested several interaction terms, but they are not statistically significant and including the interaction 
terms lower the model fit, so I did not include them in the final analysis.  
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Table 2.6. Predicted Probabilities of Winning the District Elections, Top Two 
Candidates, 17th-20th Elections 
Predicted Probability of Winning the District Election (95% CI) 
 Major party Incumbent Open seat Party Stronghold 

































Notes: All the other variables are held at their means.  
In order to interpret the regression result in a more intuitive way, I compared the 
effects of candidate assignments on the electoral outcomes by gender (Table 2.6.). The effect 
of the four independent variables show little gender difference. Running as incumbents and 
running in one’s party stronghold correlated with more than 70 probabilities of winning the 
election for both men and women. However, one should note that the 95 percent 
confidence interval is wider for women candidates than men. The probability of winning the 
election as a female incumbent is between .67 and .82, while a male incumbent’s probability 
is between .73 and .80. In terms of party stronghold, we can be 95 percent confident that the 
predicted probability as a female running in her party stronghold winning the election is 
between .61 and .79, which is high but in a wider range of prediction compared to men’s .68 
and .77.  
Women running as major party candidates, and women running for open seats also 
show wider range of confidence interval compared to their male counterparts. Female major 
party candidates’ probabilities of winning the SMD election is between .41 and .60, which is 
less than half of the winning chances; female candidates running in the open seat 
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competition also have a wider range of confidence interval, even though the average 
probability is almost identical to men’s .63.  
 
Conclusion 
The empirical evidence that this study examines points to a need for South Korean political 
parties to take more direct measures to increase women’s representation in the National 
Assembly. My analysis suggests that the gender of the candidate is less important than being 
a major party candidate or running in a favorable district. In particular, serving as an SMD 
member is the surest path to electoral victory for women, and the parties should encourage 
women to be more successful in their SMD bids. The expected spillover effect of serving as 
a PR member or in local political offices is weaker than assumed, and this weakness points 
to the importance of the SMD path. And yet, candidates’ PR memberships do not translate 
well into electoral victories for SMD seats, which account for more than 80 percent of all 
Assembly seats. Political actors have compromised with women who demanded more 
representation by passing gender quotas for PR seats and local legislative offices. However, 
taking the high stakes and prestige of the SMD membership into consideration, major 
parties have been unwilling to take bolder measures to recruit women in politics.  
This analysis demonstrates that there is no detour to SMD seats for female 
candidates. To increase women’s representation in the national legislature, major parties 
should nominate more women candidates and assign them to parties’ strongholds, rather 
than position them to run as challengers. Evidence suggests that women’s gender is not a 
liability in elections. This analysis raises a couple of new questions, however. First of all, the 
current gender quotas are applicable only to the PR seats, and the political parties do not 
allow PR members to serve more than two terms as PR members. The analysis shows that 
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neither having served as a PR member nor having local political experience significantly 
correlates with electoral victory in the district elections. This questions the lasting impact of 
gender quotas in the mixed system, and the issue of career interruption/termination of 
women national legislators, who have four years of experience only to leave the National 
Assembly.  
Second, women are more likely to run as challengers, and run in less favorable seats. 
Why? Attributing this to political party elites’ bias is simple enough, but what are the 
dynamics within the parties and the Assembly? To explain the reasons of this limited 
spillover effect of gender quotas and the practices of district assignment and nomination 
process of major parties which put women at a disadvantage, I conducted the interviews in 
South Korea, who are engaged in and have observed the inner working of the parties and the 
electoral politics of the country. The following chapter discusses the findings from this 
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In Chapter 2, I argue that gender quotas helped increase the number of women in the 
National Assembly, but the women have a hard time continuing their political careers once 
their term as a PR member is over. The graph in Figure 3.1. shows the leaking pipeline issue 
for both women and men. In 2004, there were about 30 PR women members and among 
them 5 women ran for SMD seats and 2 eventually won the election. In the same year, about 
half of PR men ran for SMD seats and two won the election. The pattern is similar: less than 
half of PR members run for the SMD elections by the end of their PR term, and less than 
half of them win the election. However, this pattern differed for women PR members in 
2016. What explains this career interruption and termination for PR members? 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The Numbers of PR Members, PR Members Seeking Election in the 
District Election, and PR Members Elected to the District Seats 
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To answer this question, I conducted in-depth interviews with 28 people over 2.5 
months in Seoul, South Korea in the summer of 2015. Even though I do not make a claim 
that the sample of this study is representative (Richard F. Fenno (1978) also acknowledges a 
similar sample issue), the interviewees in this study have diverse backgrounds: 10 men and 
18 women; four former PR members and one current SMD member; two primary 
candidates who did not win major parties’ nominations, seven party staffers, nine legislative 
staffers, four scholars, one activist; the ruling and the main opposition party members, as 
well as minor party members; and the age of the interviewees ranged from mid-20s to the 
mid-60s.   
Table 3.1. List of Interviewees 
ID# Date Last Name,  
First Name 
Party Gender Position 
1 6/15/15 anonymous Democratic Party M Legislative staffer 
2 6/17/15 anonymous Saenuri M Senior staff for the Office 
of the chairperson of the 
National Assembly at the 
timing of the interview; 
ran for SMD primaries 
but did not win the bid 
3 6/18/15 anonymous Democratic Party M Researcher; former 
legislative staffer for a 
male Democratic SMD 
member 
4 6/18/15 anonymous Democratic Party M Legislative staffer; 
formerly national 
legislative campaign staff 
5 6/15/15 anonymous Formerly Democratic 
Party, currently Saenuri 
M Legislative staffer 
6 6/22/15 anonymous  anonymous M Current government 
official; formerly secretary 
of the Presidential Office 
7 6/24/15 anonymous Democratic Party M Legislative staffer of a 
second-term PR-turned-
SMD female member 
8 6/24/15 Shin, Mi-kyung Saenuri W Head of Saenuri Party’s 
Women’s Bureau 
9 6/26/15 Kim, Kyung-mi   W Researcher 
10 6/29/15 Lee, Seung-jin Saenuri W Current senior researcher 
for  Saenuri’s Security and 
Public Administration 
Committee; Former head 




Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.52 
 
11 6/29/15 anonymous Saenuri M Legislative staffer for PR, 
1st term, female member 
12 7/2/15 anonymous Saenuri M Legislative staffer for a 
PR, 1st term, female 
member; formerly a staff 
for a first-term PR male 
representative 
13 7/2/15 anonymous Saenuri W Legislative staffer for an 
anonymous legislator 
(PR, 1st term, female); 
formerly a staffer for a 
male SMD member 
14 7/7/15 Shin, Myung Democratic Party W Former PR member (1st 
term) 
15 7/8/15 anonymous Democratic Party W Former PR member (1st 
term) 
16 7/10/15 Oh, Yoo-seok  n/a W Researcher 
17 7/13/15 Kim, Hye-sung Saenuri W Former PR member (1st 
term) 
18 7/16/15 Kim, Sung-min Democratic Party W Researcher for the 
Democratic Party’s 
Women and Family 
Committee 
19 7/16/15 anonymous Democratic Party M Current SMD member 
(2nd term) 
20 7/16/15 [Participant Observation] Press conference by the women’s organization on proposing 
SMD gender quotas; E-Room Center in Yoido, Seoul.  
21 7/17/15 Jeong, Choon-saeng Democratic Party W Head of Democratic  
Party’s Women’s Bureau 
22 7/21/15 anonymous A third party 
(anonymous) 
W Party staffer 
23 7/21/15 Lee, Jung-Mi Justice Party W Vice chair of the party 
24 7/21/15 anonymous Justice Party W Researcher for the Justice 
Party’s Women and 
Family Committee 
25 7/22/15 anonymous n/a W Activist 
26 7/23/15 anonymous Democratic Party W Former PR member (1st 
term), former vice 
minister in the 1990s 
27 7/24/15 [Participant Observation]  Colloquium on Revising Political Affairs Law to Promote 
Women’s Political Representation, National Assembly Seminar Room  
28 7/27/15 Sohn, Soo-jo Saenuri W Candidate for a SMD 
election in 2012 (Busan 
Sasang district) 
29 7/28/15 anonymous n/a W Researcher (Professor) 
30 7/31/15 Kim, Mi-kyung n/a W Researcher (Professor) 
 
The interviews revealed three themes to explain why the majority of PR members 
experience career interruption and termination. First, PR members’ main focus and expected 
role is writing bills and representing specific interest groups (such as labor unions, women’s 
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organizations, professional associations) so the lack of a geographically defined support base 
undermines the prospects of transitioning from PR posts to district-tier seats. The major 
political parties expect PR members to focus on writing bills rather than establishing local 
networks, because the parties appointed them for their policy expertise. In addition, since 
most of the PR members are newcomers to the Assembly, they spend the first one to two 
years learning formal and informal rules of the game. The PR members I interviewed 
expressed frustration that local activities and political mobilization are a totally different set 
of actions than their legislative activities in the National Assembly [Interviewee #1 and #5]. 9 
During their legislative term, PR members are busy drafting bills, and by the time they need 
to decide if they want to continue to pursue their political career, the favorable districts with 
high level of support for their parties are likely to have been claimed by other candidates 
[Interviewee #13].  
Second, due to unique culture of the National Assembly and political parties which 
deem SMD members more prestigious than PR members, the latter experience invisible 
hierarchies between the tiers. For example, the legal donation cap for PR members is only 
half of that of SMD members, and PR members’ “second-class citizen” status in the 
Assembly and in the parties discourages them from getting national and local party 
leadership positions. This leadership experience counts positively in the nomination process 
and also increases their name recognition and visibility. In addition, assuming the national 
party leadership positions and the local party’s precinct committee leadership positions as PR 
members is unlikely, due to the informal rules that prioritize seniority and SMD members. 
                                                     
9 I will use [#Interviewee Number] throughout the chapter when referring to the interviewees, instead of using 
their names. See Table 3.1. for the list of the interviewees.  
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These party leadership positions provide access to the resources that enable a candidate to 
establish personal support networks.  
Thus, PR members’ struggles to emerge as party organization leaders negatively 
influence their successful bids in the SMD elections. One interviewee pointed out that the 
lack of powerful women leaders in both parties poses barriers for female politicians to 
advance their career, suggesting the pipeline problem. Major parties reserve one deputy party 
head position for women, and one of the two speakers of the party goes to a woman 
[Interviewee #13]. Nonetheless, women party members rarely assume “powerful” 
committees’ leadership roles, such as budget, personnel, and planning committees 
[Interviewees #1, #8, #13, #15, #22]. This pattern is dissimilar to what O’Brien and Rickne 
(2016) find on the Swedish Social Democratic Party, where the gender quotas expanded the 
pool of women who were perceived to be fit for party leadership positions.  
Third, the informal practice of disadvantageous candidate district assignments, which 
supports the “sacrificial lamb” theory, hurts PR members’ probabilities of winning the SMD 
election. When the PR members express a willingness to run for the upcoming SMD 
elections, party leaders expect them to run in unfavorable districts, even though it is not 
mandated by the party’s rules. Because the PR members have already benefitted from the 
party’s appointment and, in essence, won a “bloodless” battle, they are expected to make a 
sacrifice by running in a district where they are unlikely to win. This practice is based on the 
hope of adding another seat for the party [Interviewees #2, #7, #8, #10, #21, but #1 
disagreed].  
Through my interview analysis, I argue that PR seats present a mixed bag for 
women’s political empowerment in the South Korean political system. On the one hand, PR 
seats and gender quotas have enabled women’s entry into politics. Adopting and 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.55 
 
implementing gender quotas in 2004 had an immediate effect in increasing the share of 
women in the National Assembly. Compared to 2000, when only 11 women were elected, 29 
women were elected through the 2004 election. However, this increase came mostly from 
the PR seats. Among 178 women who were elected between 2004 and 2014, 109 women or 
61 percent of them served as PR members. On the other hand, the share of SMD members 
is less than 10 percent until 2016, and the increase has plateaued since 2004: 13 percent in 
2004, 13.7 percent in 2008, 15.7 percent in 2012 and 17 percent in 2016. In addition, the PR 
members have little institutional support to become local and national party leaders which is 
a stepping stone to increase one’s visibility and national recognition. Limited access to this 
support hinders contacting local constituencies frequently, or establishing rapport with the 
local population (Tremblay 2006). Given the South Korean parties’ rule that politicians 
cannot serve more than one term as PR members, women’s expertise in specific issue areas 
and lack of geographically defined support base hurt their potential as a district 
representative. Women’s expertise in specific issue areas hurts their career because they are 
pigeonholed as representatives of a specific group or an issue area (labor union, women’s 
movement, education) rather than broad, general representatives who can represent diverse 
body of constituents. Lack of geographically defined support base for women and the single 
member district system at the district level also undermine the electoral competitiveness, as 
discussed by Jo Freeman:  
Our [U.S.] legislative bodies are based on representation by geographic district, not 
identity, interests or ideology. The single member district favors candidates who 
represent a majority, not a minority, or voters in a district, or at least a majority of 
the voters in the dominant party’s primary. Ethnic groups could organize and elect 
one of their own when they were geographically concentrated – and even when each 
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new group took decades to crack the barriers of existing party leadership. Women 
are geographically dispersed, making it hard to mobilize the majority necessary to be 
elected (Freeman 2000, 233).  
In the following section, I analyze how money, implicit institutional bias against PR and 
women members, and masculine norms of socializing interact with these three themes.  
 
Findings from Qualitative Analysis 
Theme 1. The Role of Money in Campaigns and Politics 
A Democratic politician of California Jesse M. Unruh once stated “money is the mother’s 
milk of politics” (Uhlig 1987). Interviewees cited that money was one of the major 
challenges they faced when considering to run and while they were running their campaigns. 
Money is required to maintain local support networks. In South Korea, it is customary to 
contribute money to events like weddings, funerals, and office launching, but elected and 
appointed officials are not allowed to make this contribution. Still many people expect their 
politician “friends” or “acquaintances” to contribute to show off their connections or simply 
to get benefits [Interviewee #26]. When interacting with the local constituents or local party 
members, legislators end up picking up the bills to treat meals and gifts to the voters and 
other actors in the district even though it is prohibited by law. Sometimes their friends pay 
on behalf of the politicians to save them from legal troubles [Interviewee #26].  
Maintaining a local network is expensive, and the politicians are often expected to 
contribute money to local events. Therefore, having independent financial resources is one 
of the factors political parties implicitly consider when they appoint local party leaders:  
I think the party nominated Rep. Sohn [the interviewee’s boss] as a local 
party leader because the party thought she was independently wealthy as she 
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had her own private business. Party leaders know it is expensive to maintain 
local network, including paychecks for the office staff and maintaining local 
office space. Also the former district legislator was also a woman so the place 
is women-friendly [Interviewee #11].  
 
 In another interview with a weekly magazine, Interviewee #26 mentioned that money 
is critical in politics because conducting legislative research, getting legal advice, conducting 
public opinion surveys, and holding consortium to get advice from experts is expensive. 
Even though the National Assembly provides research service on legislative issues, the 
research service sometimes misses the deadline or their research products do not meet the 
intended direction of the research. In order to produce research products tailored to a 
specific goal, legislators need to spend extra money to hire private research help. She 
advocated for more political funds available to the legislators which will improve the 
legislative activities but she emphasized the contribution and the flow of the money should 
be more transparent (Sook-I Lee 2009). 
If money is critical in maintaining networks and being successful in political careers, 
limited access to money can explain why some are less successful than others, also a gender 
gap in political success. One way to glean the gender gap in personal wealth is to see 
legislators’ reported income and property. In 2014 and 2015, all top ten legislators in terms 
of the amount of reported personal wealth were men; three out of the bottom 10 legislators 
were women (Minho Kim 2015; Newsis 2014). On average, South Korean women’s labor 
participation rate is 50.2 percent in 2016, and men’s labor participation rate is 71.1 percent 
(Statistics Korea 2016a); among them, 41 percent of women workers are temporary workers 
(including seasonal workers and part time workers) whereas only 26.4 percent of men are 
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(Statistics Korea 2016b). These figures are not a perfect indicator to show a gender gap in 
wealth in the country. Moreover, politicians are generally political and economic elites thus 
these aggregate statistics on the whole population cannot be used to show women politicians 
are under-resourced than their male counterparts. However, this is one way to illustrate why 
women are less likely to engage in politics than men.  
How is the political contribution distributed by the party affiliation, gender, seniority, 
and the seat type? How accurate are the interviewee’s claims that PR members and women 
face challenges in raising money? Table 3.2. was created based on the data provided by the 
Center for Freedom of Information and Transparency (2012, 2014). Overall, the Saenuri 
members raised more than other party members, but there is a gender gap within the party 
(Table 3.2.). Men, in both major parties, raise more funds than their female colleagues, but 
the Democratic women raise more than the Saenuri women. The minor party women raised 
more than their male counterparts, but it is due to an outlier, Rep. Sang-jeong Shim of the 
Justice Party who was ranked the 10th in the total contribution amount. Studies based on the 
U.S. cases found that women raise as much as men (Adams and Schreiber 2011), even 
though Democratic women have an advantage over the Republican women (Crespin and 
Deitz 2010). This gender parity in campaign finance does not apply to the South Korean 
context, however.  
On average, SMD members raised about twice more than the PR members did 
between 2012 and 2014, partly because the contribution cap for PR members is only a half 
of that of SMD members: SMD members can raise up to KRW150,000,000 (or USD150K) 
on the non-election year and KRW300,000,000 (or USD300K) on the years with the national 
election; PR members can raise up to KRW150,000,000 on both election and non-election 
year (Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017). Interestingly, the seniority of the 
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members does not correspond to the average amount of contribution the members raised. 
Overall, the 3rd term legislators raised the most, KRW188, 332, and the 4th term women 
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Table 3.2. Political Contribution by Party, Seat Type, and Seniority, 2012-2014 
  
M+W Men Women Diff (M-W) 
Total  
(2012-2014) 
Num. Obs 895 758 137 
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Figures 3.2. and 3.3. shows the distribution of the contribution amount for all male 
and female legislators between 2012 and 2014. The majority of both men and women raised 
around KRW150,000,000, and more than 50 male legislators raised around 
KRW300,000,000 which is the maximum amount they could raise. On the other hand, more 
than 80 female legislators raised below the average.    
 
Figure 2.2. The Amount of Donations to Male Legislators, 2012-2014 
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Figure 3.3. The Amount of Donations to Female Legislators, 2012-2014 
 
The only female legislator on the Top 10 list is Rep. Sangjeong Shim (Table 3.3.), and 
Rep. Eunhee Kwon from Daegu raised the second largest sum of money. She ranked the 
47th and raised KRW4,360,000 less than Rep. Shim did. Park Geun-hye, who served five 
terms before being elected as the president, raised KRW175,541,000 which is the highest 
among PR members, followed by the Democratic Party’s Rep. Gi-sik Kim who raised 
KRW162,109,000 and Rep. Myung-sook Han (female, Democratic, 3rd term) who 
accumulated KRW158,161,000 (Center for Freedom of Information and Transparency 2012, 
2014). According to an interviewee in this study, not many women stick it out in the local 
politics, as it is costly to maintain organized support networks. Many of them quit before 
making it to the next election. Even those with a strong network wish to move to more 
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favorable and more winnable districts when opportunities arise. Many of the local party 
leaders bear the involved cost out of their pocket to maintain the networks [Interviewee #8]. 
 
Table 3.3. Top 10 Legislators in Political Contribution Raised 
Rank Province District Name Party Amount  
(in 1000 
KRW) 
Year Sex Term 
1 South Jolla Mokpo Park, Jiwon Democratic 317,737 2012 m 3 
2 North Jolla Jeong-eup Yoo, Sungyup Democratic 317,495 2012 m 2 





Kim, Jaewon Saenuri 310,660 2014 m 2 
5 South 
Gyongsang 
Jinju 2 Kim, Jaekyong Saenuri 309,972 2012 m 3 
6 Busan Namgu 1 Kim, Joenghoon Saenuri 309,404 2012 m 3 
7 Gwangju Gwangsan 2 Lee, Yongsup Democratic 308,920 2012 m 2 
8 North 
Gyongsang 
Pohang Namgu2 Park, Myungjae Saenuri 308,030 2014 m 1 





Saenuri 306,013 2012 m 4 
10 Gyonggi GoyangDukyang
1 
Shim, Sangjeong Justice 304,236 2014 f 2 
Data: Author’s analysis based on Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017 
 
As there are so many variations in the individual-level data with high standard 
deviation, a couple of outliers can skew the distribution of the data. Following Murray 
(2012), I categorized the legislators into five groups by the amount of political contribution 
they raised (quintile). 0-20% means the bottom 20% in terms of the amount; 80-100% 
category is the top 20% legislators. I examined the distribution by sex, seat type, seniority, 
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Data: Author’s analysis based on Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017 
 
Compared by sex, men are similarly distributed in the amount of contributions they 
receive; about 22 percent of the male legislators are ranked at the top 20 percent in terms of 
the political contributions received, and 18 percent of the male legislators are ranked in the 
bottom 20 percent. On the other hand, about 31 percent of the female legislators are located 
in the bottom 20 percent of contributions raised, and only 7 percent of the female legislators 
are ranked in the top 20 percent.  
Again, the difference in the contribution cap for PR members and SMD members 
partly explains why there are no PR members who ranked in the top 20 percent. Compared 
to those who do not have seats, PR members do have some advantages as members of the 
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Assembly, in that PR members can open a local office space. Those who are not elected to 
office and wait for the next election are not allowed to open and maintain a local office and 
cannot get any contributions [Interviewee #28], which is critical to organize one’s own local 
network. Interviewee #28 held a local party leadership position, which gives her access to 
the local political actors. However, she could not have an office space and the leadership 
position was unpaid, nor could she legally raise contributions [Interviewee #28]. Considering 
this campaign finance disparity, women’s comparable electoral success rate, especially that of 
the Democratic women (Table 2.2.), is more impressive.  
Interviewees said novice politicians have a hard time raising contributions. First time 
legislators with low level of name recognition and weak network have a hard time raising up 
to the contribution limit. One of the legislators who served multiple terms in a district in 
Seoul said if a person becomes well-known, they, then, had no difficulties in raising money 
up to the legal limitations (“just open a bank account and the contribution floods in”), yet, 
this same person struggled as a first-term legislator. Rep. Myung-soon Kang said male 
legislators maintain a culture of supporting each other and unite as a group with the people 
who share the same local or alumni network, but women do not have a similar kind of 
support network (Soon-I Lee et al. 2009).  
Interestingly, however, the contribution data in Table 3.4. show that the seniority in 
the Assembly does not correlate with the amount of contributions legislators raise. About 30 
percent of the first time legislators are ranked in the bottom 20 percent on the list and only 7 
percent on the top 20 percent. More than half of the second-term legislators made it to the 
top 40 percent of the list. On the other hand, those who serve more than 5 terms are ranked 
at the bottom, in terms of the amount of political contributions they raised. In relation to 
party affiliations, the availability of the two major party legislators’ campaign funds is pretty 
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similar but the independent legislators tend to raise less than the major party members, and 
no one was ranked in the top 20 percent category. Eleven minority party members, out of 34 
in total, did raise quite a large sum of money.  
Maintaining a local network and preparing for the next election as a non-elected 
official is even more costly and challenging than as an incumbent legislator. Progressive third 
parties are more active in nominating women candidates, but they have a hard time 
maintaining the network due to the low prospects of getting elected in the 
majoritarian/plurality voting system. Many women with the minor party affiliation found it 
difficult to remain in local politics, especially since the likelihood of winning the election is 
very slim in the current majoritarian voting system. Even after the electoral defeat, in order 
to maintain the local network to run again in four years one needs to be independently 
wealthy and well-connected. It is harder to maintain that resources for women than men. So 
a lot of women in the district quit before running again in the next election [Interviewee 
#23]. Another member from the same third party shared an observation on why it is 
expensive to be in politics:  
I do not know exactly, but I heard that you need to be on the right line, not 
to be stingy with buying meals, bringing presents, sponsoring events…people 
usually do not bring an exorbitantly high amount of money as it will be easy 
to trace and be reported…One of acquaintances of mine who works for a 
National Assembly member from the Democratic Party once told me that 
[his/her] legislator does not do that, only looks at the person’s qualification 
[when selecting people as a staff or recommending people for positions]. 
This implies that everyone else does [Interviewee #22].   
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These interviews show the role of money in politics, from more legitimate and legal use of 
money for legislative activities to more underground activities which legislators are expected 
to perform due to political culture and to maintain personal networks. PR members have a 
harder time raising contributions due to legal limits and also due to less privilege their 
position confers compared to their SMD peers, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Women are less well-connected and overall raise fewer contributions than their male 
counterparts. Being short on political funding, PR members, women, and third party 
candidates face challenges to be competitive in the political arena.  
 
Theme 2. Invisible Hierarchy between SMD and PR Members in the Assembly and 
in the Parties    
The most prominent political cleavage of South Korea is based on the geographic regions. 
The Saenuri Party enjoys high level of support from the Southeast part of the country (the 
Gyongsang Province), the Democratic Party has a strong support base on the Southwest 
region of the Jolla Province, and the metropolitan Seoul area is considered a “swing” region. 
The two major political parties appeal to voters by focusing on this regional cleavage rather 
than the issue or interest group based mobilization, commonly seen in the PR system. The 
mixed system in this heavily region-based political climate renders PR members a unique 
status in the Assembly – they are considered “second-class” members in the national 
legislature and the party [Interviewee #3]. These differences in perceived prestige between 
tiers in the mixed system are also observed in Japan and Taiwan: Timothy Rich (2012) wrote 
that some Japanese legislators he interviewed described “using Olympics imagery, interviews 
with legislators in Japan identified district legislators as ‘gold medalists’ with the party list and 
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dual-listed candidates who lose in the district but saved on the list (so called ‘zombie 
legislators’) relegated to silver and bronze respectively” (Rich 2012, 3).  
Women can initially enter the Assembly through the gender quotas as PR members, 
but major parties’ nomination rules limit PR members from serving more than one term in 
the PR seats, besides exceptional cases such as being a party leader around the election 
campaigning season such as Rep. Geun-Hye Park of the Saenuri Party (who was later elected 
to the presidency), Rep. Myung-sook Han and Rep. Jong-In Kim of the Democratic Party. 
In order for the PR members to continue their political career, they need to win district-tier 
elections and become SMD members. However, establishing their own local support 
network as a PR member, which will be a strong predictor of their success in the SMD bid, 
is challenging for a couple of reasons, including the money factor examined in the previous 
section.  
The formal and informal political institutions are mandated by rules and culture 
which favor masculine mode of interaction and networking. Due to this implicit institutional 
bias, women have a harder time being a part of the existing political network. Interviewees 
pointed out the limited access to resources such as local and national party leadership 
positions, strong societal network (high school and university alumni networks), and the 
practice of discriminatory district assignment for PR members, which contribute to PR 
members, and specifically women’s, low likelihood of success.  
 
2.1 Access to the National and Party Leadership Position 
 
Some interviewees pointed out that lack of powerful women party leaders poses a pipeline 
problem in the political party for women politicians’ careers. Major parties reserve one 
deputy party head position for women, and one of the two spokesperson positions goes to a 
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woman [Interviewee #12]   but women party members rarely assume “powerful” 
committees’ leadership roles, such as the budget, personnel, and planning committees 
[Interviewees #8, #12, #15, #22]. One of the first steps candidate aspirants usually take is to 
apply for a precinct committee leadership position – a springboard to get nominated for the 
SMD candidacy – as it opens up access to the local networks and secures name recognition 
and privilege, but PR women rarely get the position (W.-H. Kim, Lee, and Kim 2012; P. 
Yoon 2015). The selection process of a precinct committee person involves both public 
opinion polls in the precinct to gauge the level of name recognition and local mobilization, 
as well as the screening by the national party committee through reviewing their résumé and 
the interviews. Therefore, having high visibility and name recognition at the national level 
alone cannot guarantee a local leadership position (P. Yoon 2015).   
Precincts usually have already established networks around the district’s SMD 
incumbent, so it is challenging for newcomers to create an alternative support group; 
aligning with a new person would have consequences for the people in the local political 
scene so the local political actors are usually cautious about changing their loyalty. The SMD 
member has a power to nominate candidates for the local elections of the same precinct, so 
there is a strong hierarchical, patron-client relationship between the incumbent national 
assembly member and the local elected officials, such as city councilperson or local 
legislative members. They volunteer for the local party activities and events and support the 
SMD incumbent. They also help election campaigns of the National Assembly member if 
he/she runs for reelections.  
They are not only at the giving-end, though; the local members sometimes request 
financial support for their retreats (which is not actually legal) to the incumbent or those 
who are trying to establish their own network. If they refuse, the local groups retaliate by 
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hurting their reputation or spreading rumors [Interviewee #26]. As the local political scene is 
constructed around the National Assembly incumbent, a newcomer has a hard time getting 
into the network; sometimes a newcomer faces a hostile interaction with the local 
stakeholders who want to protect their turf [Interviewees #8, #28]. It is common for major 
parties to nominate candidates who lack a local support base for the national legislative 
election due to their unique contribution to the political party’s campaign strategy, such as to 
attract young voters or other minorities. Subsequently, those who have strong local base who 
did not get a nomination due the outside newcomers (or the “parachutes” from the central 
party) leave the party and run as independents. They also make it difficult for the new 
appointed person to mobilize the local party networks [Interviewee #2 and Rep. Young-Gyo 
Seo during the participant observation #27].   
One of the interviewees’ story illustrates this complicated local dynamic. As a woman 
in her 20s running for a national seat, Interviewee #28 attracted a lot of media attention at 
the national level. She got a nomination from the Saenuri Party, which utilized her image as a 
novelty to appeal to younger voters who do not usually support the conservative party. Even 
then-party head, now impeached President Geun-Hye Park, supported her candidacy and 
canvassed with her in the precinct she was running. She is an example of a candidate who 
has national-level name recognition and the support from the national party but who lacks a 
local base. The party used her to fight the image of a party for dominantly old, male 
supporters. The party appointed her to leadership positions after the election to promote the 
new images of the party.  
During the interview, she shared several occasions she was challenged by the local 
political machine. When she attended local events during the campaign season to meet 
voters – to give her “the cold shoulder” and embarrass her – the event organizers close to 
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her contender did not prepare a seat for her on the stage. Some local politicians mocked her, 
saying a “baby” like her should go home and “eat snacks,” which is a phrase used to mock 
adults due to its association with kids. After she had been defeated by the opposition party 
candidate, the national party nominated her as the present party leader, which ignited a 
strong opposition from the local party members [Interviewee #28]. In the meeting to discuss 
the agenda to appoint Ms. Sohn to be the next local party chair, about 7 out of 10 local party 
leaders did not attend the meeting to show their disagreement with the decision. Most of the 
absentees were anti-President Geun-Hye Park’s faction members who were close to Mr. Je-
won Jang, the main competitor against Ms. Sohn (Impeter News 2012). Her competitor was 
resentful that the party nominated Ms. Sohn as the local party chairpersonship, so he wrote 
to the national party to challenge the decision [Interviewee #28].  
 
Even during the national election campaign, the former legislator Mr. Je-
Won Jang’s supporters did not help my campaigns [even though she was 
nominated by the party] and I had to organize local networks from scratch 
and started from the beginning. Local politicians and key players did not help 
anyone until the election was over, because they were afraid to be in the 
wrong group and afraid of the backlash after the election in case they did not 
help the “right” person…Mr. Jang owns two universities in the district and 
everything on the university campus is related to the Board…from catering 
service to even installing vending machines on campus, many people in the 
district are contractors of the universities. If Mr. Jang knows that someone 
with a contract on campus is helping my campaign, he terminates the 
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contract. When I picked competent people to work for my campaign, he 
overbid and took the people to his camp [Interviewee #28].   
 
The local electorates do not appreciate the strategic nomination by the national party 
organization (more in Chapter 5), as they question what the candidate has contributed to the 
local community. Also, the existing local party networks gets disrupted due to this conflict 
between the new group and the existing group [Interviewees #8 and #10]. The political 
parties are well aware of these conflicts and make strategic decisions when nominating 
candidates without strong local support base, which is not always successful.   
Even though a PR member has national-level name recognition for his/her 
contribution in their own field, they do not always enjoy a high-level visibility among the 
voters or a strong support network among the local political stakeholders. The PR members 
I interviewed expressed their frustration that local activities and political mobilization is a 
totally different game than their legislative activities in Yoido, the part of Seoul where the 
National Assembly is located [Interviewees #1 and #13]. During their legislative term, PR 
members are busy drafting bills; by the time they need to decide if they want to continue to 
pursue their political career, the favorable districts with high level of support for their parties 
are likely to have been claimed by other potential candidates already [Interviewee #12].  
 
Usually female PR members are recruited for their experience and expertise 
in law, journalism, medicine, welfare, or women’s movement…on the local 
level, however, network formed around the alumni association, marital or 
familial ties, or regional ties are stronger...if you are not a member of 
women’s associations, the Korea Green Mother, or if you do not live in the 
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area or have kids, your appeal to the voters is weak. During the 18th election 
campaign, she [the interviewee’s boss] faced a lot of limitations in the district, 
even though she started the district activities in 2005…when Rep. Kim 
visited local events, aldermen and councilmen initially treated her like an 
outcast; it was imperative to make them to be on her side. She could not 
ignore or disdain them but respect and take good care of them to have a 
synergy effect. Make sure to assign “your” people to be in every stage of 
decision-making process [Interviewee #7].  
 
In order to win nominations in the district, the candidate-hopefuls need not only personal 
networks with key players but also should be able to mobilize a large number of voters 
which are usually done by “buying votes” for the primaries, which is not legal but a prevalent 
practice:  
Securing party members who can be your supporters is critical in organizing 
local networks. Mr. Jang owns a couple of universities in the city, so he visits 
college classrooms and ask the students to raise their hands if they live in the 
district. And then he hands in the party membership forms and the money 
worth 6 months of membership dues – if you pay 2000KRW for 6 months, 
you become a loyal party member. So he hands out 20000KRW. It is very 
common to “buy” party members this way [Interviewee #28].   
 
I also work on promoting party membership in my district. Some people may 
criticize this as privatizing political parties or corruption, but I think it has 
positive elements in that this practice expands the support base and the party 
membership…I need to recruit them by the end of July so they can maintain 
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their membership for 6 months and be eligible to participate in the 
primaries…some local players approach the candidate hopefuls and ask for a 
favor in return for them helping the people mobilize the potential party 
members [Interviewee #2].   
 
As 30 percent of the nomination consideration is based on the public 
opinion polls on the local party members, currently those who are planning 
to run for the legislative elections are working on finding local constituents 
who would join the party and vote for them during the primaries. The 
monthly membership fee is not a lot – 2000KRW – so it is common to 
“buy” the party members…persuade them to fill out the membership form 
and pay the dues on behalf of them [Interviewee #11].  
 
Having a prior connection to the district is critical to win the local leadership position 
and/or the candidate nomination. If one does not have an apparent “connection”, such as 
alumni networks, the district being her or her family’s hometown, having a business there, he 
or she needs to make one years ahead of the election season [Interviewee #19]. Holding 
local party leadership positions is critical in forming one’s support group which is 
instrumental in winning a nomination and an election, and also the experience increases 
one’s reputation in the local and the national political scene. Thus, women and PR members’ 
limited success in winning local party leadership undermines their prospects in continuing 





Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.75 
 
2.2 “The Sacrificial Lamb” – District Assignment Practices for PR Members Seeking 
SMD Elections  
 
When the PR members express their willingness to run for the upcoming SMD 
elections, the party leaders expect them to run in unfavorable districts. As the PR members 
have already benefitted from the party’s appointment and won the “bloodless battle,” the 
logic goes, the PR members should sacrifice themselves and run in the unlikely district to 
bring one more seat for the party Interviewee #2, #7, #8, #10, #21, but #1 disagreed]. A 
female PR member’s experience, whose legislative staff I interviewed, illustrates that this is 
an especially tough challenge to surmount for female PR members. She assumed a local 
party leadership position, an enormous feat for a PR member. Nevertheless, after serving as 
the local committee leader for a year, she announced that she would not run for SMD 
elections, citing health issues.  
In reality, as her staffer told me, the district was not favorable to her party and she 
did not see the possibility of winning the election, in spite of expending resources and time 
on securing a local support network. She initiated an effort to build a local base as a PR 
member and the party made an unusual step to nominate the PR woman to a local 
leadership position. Yet it was clear to her that a victory was unlikely. Before coming to the 
Assembly, she was independently wealthy, thanks to her business success; still, maintaining 
the local network proved costly [Interviewee #11]. This discriminatory party’s nomination 
practice supports the “sacrificial lamb” theory, which argues that women are less likely to 
win the elections than men because political parties nominate women candidates to districts 
with little chance of winning or to districts where popular incumbents run for reelection, 
thus “satisfying a desire to demonstrate diversity to the public while saving more winnable 
seats for male candidates” (K. A. Dolan 2004, 41).  
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.76 
 
Theme 3. The Culture of Heavy Drinking  
Interestingly, numerous interviewees mentioned the importance of networking through 
alcohol [#2, #5, #7, #10, #19, #22]. The culture of high volume alcohol consumption and 
the critical role alcohol plays in the social setting is one of the factors contributing to the 
male-oriented political network and “old boys’ club.” This is not unique to Korea – Jo 
Freeman discusses how American parties in the early 1900s developed from “social clubs in 
the nineteenth-century saloon” and for women political party members, “alcohol would not 
be the glue that held them together” thus created alternative party organizations (Freeman 
2000, 153–54).  
Despite Prohibition, it would take many years to separate politics from male social 
rituals, in particular that of alcohol consumption. In the 1940s, Katherine St. George 
was told she could not become chairman of the Orange County (N.Y.) Republican 
Party because she “won’t be able to go into the saloons with the boys.” As late as 
1970 a Chicago alderman told two female political scientists that women were 
handicapped as members of the City Council because so much of its business was 
discussed in bars, often at night. In his mind politics and the saloon were both part 
of the male domain (Freeman 2000, 160). 
 
Interviewees agreed that women have a hard time being a part of this network, due to 
gendered norms on social activities and drinking. In general, women do not feel comfortable 
staying outside of home until late hours and drinking with men, as women are more likely to 
have responsibilities at home. More importantly, drinking until late at night with men can 
harm the women’s reputation (and sometimes marriage), as people question their modesty 
and decency as “respectable” women, both married and unmarried. If the person is not 
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married, she is even more susceptible to badmouthing than married women. Much 
networking and decision-making is done in informal settings, which usually involves alcohol, 
and women are excluded from this masculine culture. Not only the late-night drinking, but 
the other common local mobilization activities, such as local hiking groups, retreats, and 
alumni networks, are dominated by male members [Interviewee #2].   
 
[How did you get a nomination for a district where you do not have any 
connection? It is not your hometown, you did not go to school there or you 
had business in the district] I knew the district would be separated in two and 
a new district would be created. So I was getting ready to run for nomination. 
I met Rep. *** in a private setting a couple of times, and socialized with 
journalists and the alderman of the area. I bought a lot of drinks multiple 
times to them, and asked to give me a position as a legal advisor of the 
district to the aldermen. [Don’t you think this kind of nomination process 
and the networking is gendered? I do not think a single woman like me can 
call people and offer drinks]. Yes, people will think you are crazy. [How 
about a married woman?] even crazier…among men, drinking together is a 
strong bonding experience [Interviewee #19].  
 
Even though you may not like to drink, the situation dictates that you drink 
with people pretty frequently whenever and wherever you go…it is hard to 
decline the offer or not to drink when all the others drink…when you meet 
and talk with reporters, you go drink at a bar, not going to a fancy 
steakhouse, you know? In that aspect, as you mentioned earlier, men do have 
an advantage in meeting people with various background and socialize…also 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.78 
 
when a woman is too opinionated, vocal, or ambitious, people do not like 
her…I have seen many instances like that [Interviewee #5].   
 
Women may face difficulties in recruiting supporters because hiking clubs or 
alumni network are the major route to recruit and maintain supports in the 
district…Establishing and maintaining network is physically demanding…the 
majority of the people socialize and drink until late at night and establish a 
rapport with the voters and other party members through it. For men it is 
less challenging to stay out until late and to hang out with people until the 
wee hours but not so much as a woman [Interviewee #2].  
 
Men organize and attend drinking gathering often to be close to each 
other…also as there are a lot of male-only informal groups they go to 
commercial sexual establishments to rub shoulders. Even though this is less 
common than in the past, I am not sure if at the local level people completely 
stopped doing it. I guess some still do it tacitly…through these activities men 
develop strong bonding while women are excluded from it…so it is not easy 
for women to be a part of the network. Party members had similar concerns 
when we were the Democratic Labor Party [Interviewee #22].   
 
Also, a female interviewee shared her experience with unwanted touching and being forced 
to stay until the whole party was over:  
When you meet the local constituents, you should get used to “physical 
intimacy” – I literally mean physical. That means women will encounter 
unwanted touching. Even if you are a national legislator, the local senior 
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people do not care. Regardless of your physical attractiveness…some people 
even ask you to hug them…and you cannot avoid or run away from it. Some 
come and shake hands and very naturally come and hug me, unexpectedly. In 
that case you cannot escape from it because they are voters…There are many 
unpleasant things happening in those gatherings. For example, people urge 
you to drink more or touch you, or not letting you go home when it is really 
late…asking me why I have not married or if they may contact me later for 
meeting or something like that…but you need to just laugh away, and still 
need to be firm. It is not easy [Interviewee #22].  
These interviewees show that socializing and establishing a network – through drinking, 
buying votes and fighting unfavorable treatment by the local establishment – follow a 
challenging unwritten rule women have to navigate in the political arena. Through these 
exclusively male social circles and drinking occasions, favors are exchanged and the sense of 
community is formed. The gendered norms which sexualize women and discourage them 
from being “too active” in these activities, prevent women from gaining social and political 
capital to be successful in their political careers.   
 
Theme 4. Opportunities for Women in the District – “Positive” Stereotypes of 
Women  
Many interviewees confirmed the national and local politics is a gendered place, and women 
in general experience lack of access to power, resources, or networks. However, “positive” 
gender stereotypes work in favor of women and some play their strengths to gain support 
from the voters, and some women use a more “feminine” leadership style and emphasize 
their policy interests in traditionally feminine issue areas.  
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Men “do politics” through drinking, eating and socializing, while women 
spend their time studying policies to draft bills, and preparing for the 
committee meetings. Some men joke that they need to propose a bill to limit 
time female PR legislators can spend on studying! As men do not study the 
bills as much as women do, they ended up following women’s arguments 
during the Legislative Committee meetings [Interviewee #26].  
 
Men are busy meeting and drinking with people. They need to brag and think 
more about how they are perceived by others, they need to follow and meet 
“powerful” people…while men go out meeting party leaders and “hotshots”, 
I spend time meeting dozens of constituents in my district, especially 
“mothers”. That is a better use of time and more meaningful [Interviewee 
#27, Rep. Young-Gyo Seo].   
 
I was ignored a lot in my district because I am young and I am a woman. 
Some even told me “go and eat snacks [which is similar to “go drink more 
mom’s milk]”. It was very challenging to participate in the local political 
scene as it revolves around old men’s network. I was bullied and left out. 
However, citizens in the district found me relatable and approachable. They 
treated me as they do their daughters and gave me advice when they are not 
happy with how things are going on in politics. I think that is an advantage of 
being a young woman [Interviewee #28].   
 
As women are more approachable and amiable in general, so it works for 
women’s favor when they interact with senior citizens in the local districts 
[Interviewee #11].  
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When it comes to building local networks, men do have advantages in 
establishing networks in the masculine setting. However, women have 
strengths when interacting with senior citizens. When they meet seniors they 
massage their shoulders and foot [which is a gesture of love and caring in the 
Korean context, usually done by children to their parents or grandparents] 
and these gestures are well-taken and touch their heart; some of the elderly 
say “even my own kids to not treat me well like this”. Of course the majority 
of the networking is done in a masculine way but women also have some 
advantages [Interviewee #13].  
 
These interviews support the existing literature that maintains some gender stereotypes 
positively affect women’s political success in elections (Black and Erickson 2003; Herrnson, 
Lay, and Stokes 2003). Some women can successfully establish a strong rapport with the 
voters and “run as a woman” (K. A. Dolan 2005, 31) by playing positive gender-based 
stereotypes and emphasizing issue areas such as education, poverty, and welfare, in which 
women are deemed to be more competent. Nevertheless, local party leaders and key players 
are almost all men, which makes it hard for women to have access to these positions 
[Interviewee #8]. Some newcomers to the local political scene experience difficulty being 
accepted by the existing establishment who does not want to let these women establish their 
own support network, as reviewed in the previous section.  
 
Conclusion 
Interviews with the former and current legislators and their staffers provide insights 
into career interruptions and terminations of PR members, especially women, in spite of 
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having prior political experience as incumbent National Assembly members. The 
interviewees’ responses show the high cost involved with establishing and maintaining local 
networks, and how the masculine way of local networking undermines the potential power 
the women’s movement can play in empowering women.  
The major political parties expect PR members to focus on writing bills rather than 
establishing local networks, because the parties appointed them for their policy expertise. In 
addition, assuming the national party leadership positions and the local party’s precinct 
committee leadership positions as PR members is unlikely, due to the informal rules that 
prioritize seniority and SMD members. This pattern is dissimilar to what O’Brien and Rickne 
(2016) find on the Swedish Social Democratic Party, where the gender quotas expanded the 
pool of women who were perceived to be fit for party leadership positions.  
 This qualitative analysis fleshes out the statistical findings I examine in Chapter 2. 
One of the major findings from the quantitative analysis is the gender of the candidate is less 
important than being a major party candidate or running in a favorable district. Second, 
candidates’ PR memberships do not translate well into electoral victories for SMD seats, and 
third, women experience unfavorable district assignments and usually run as challengers 
against the incumbent. The interviews analyzed in this chapter show the incredible barriers 
PR members and female politicians have to surmount to survive the local politics and win a 
nomination. Therefore, it is not surprising that once these women win the nomination after 
overcoming all the troubles, their success rate is as high as men’s, as I demonstrate in 
Chapter 2. The limited access to financial resources and leadership positions, overtly 
discriminatory district assignment practice for PR members, and the emphasis on drafting 
bills without geographically defined support group can explain why the majority of PR 
members experience political career interruption and termination after their terms are over.  
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Chapter 4. Who Represents Women’s Interests? Women-Friendly Bill Sponsorship in 
the South Korean National Assembly, 2000-2016 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I examine reasons for numerical underrepresentation of women in 
the National Assembly, focusing on the candidate nomination and the election stages. Once 
women are elected, however, what do they actually deliver? Does the gender of legislators 
influence their legislative activities? In this chapter, I assess the relationship between the 
descriptive and substantive representation of women. I analyze the national lawmakers’ 
legislative activities, focusing on their women-friendly bill (WFB) sponsorship activities. Who 
proposed WFB and why did they push these agendas in the National Assembly? Does 
gender affect one’s policy priorities, controlling for other factors? As the number of  female 
legislators increases, do we see more cooperation among them or less? I answered these 
questions using statistical analysis and interviews with former and current legislators, 
activists, scholars, and political party members.   
During my field work in July 2015, one of the interviewees told me that 144 
women’s organizations were planning a press conference to demand mandated 30 percent 
candidate gender quotas for the district-tier, National Assembly elections in the following 
year.10 On July 16th around 11:00 am, I arrived at E-Room Center, a vocational training 
facility run by the Korean Disabled People’s Institute, where the press conference was 
scheduled. The center was in a five-minute’s walking distance from the National Assembly 
building. The seminar room was in the basement of the Center; I found a seat and looked 
around. There were 12 people sitting in the audience, but I could not if they were journalists 
                                                     
10 This is listed as #20 in the interviewee list in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1.).  
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or the staffers from the organizations represented. The conference was started by calling the 
names of the 13 representatives from the 12 organizations present; even though 114 
organizations signed the statement, not all of the organizations sent a representative to the 
press conference.  
 The head of the Korean Women’s Association United, Ms. Geum-Ok Kim, was the 
first presenter. She opened her brief presentation by commenting on the poor attendance at 
the press conference which indicated how indifferent the political parties and the national 
legislators were to the issue of women’s political representation. Also, she continued, this 
was a sign that the women’s movement was fragmented, which made the political 
establishment not consider women’s movement as a serious negotiation partner. She was 
pessimistic that any changes they proposed would be adopted before the upcoming 
elections. 
 The second presenter, Dr. Eunjoo Kim from the Center for Korean Women and 
Politics, argued that the women’s organizations needed to focus on expanding the number 
of PR seats in the Assembly in order to increase the number of female legislators. The 
current gender quotas are only applicable to PR seats, and it is unlikely for the political 
parties to adopt effective gender quotas for the SMD contest. Thus, increasing the number 
of PR seats will be the only viable option to elect more women to the national legislature. 
The last presenter, Ms. Mi-kyung Ko from the Korea Women’s Hot Line, argued for 
adopting the mandatory 30 percent candidate gender quotas for the district-tier elections, 
with sanctions for non-compliance. She also suggested that strategic, top-down nomination 
process should be adopted to nominate more women candidates, as primaries disadvantage 
women. The press conference ended in 20 minutes.  
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 The press conference did not attract a sizeable crowd, even though it was a short 
five-minute walk from the National Assembly and close to the two major parties’ 
headquarters. No political party members nor the current legislators attended the 
conference. After the event, I came back to the National Assembly building to meet two 
interviewees [#18 and #19]. I asked them why there were no reporters from the major news 
media, nor any party members and the national legislators – the target of these women’s 
organizations messages. Their response was firm and similar: the political establishment does 
not care about women’s organizations.  
 The interviewees expressed deep disappointment with the women’s organizations. 
What happened to the women’s movement? The 2004 legislative elections were a watershed 
for the history of South Korean women’s political participation. It was the first legislative 
election in which the mandatory 50 percent gender quotas for the PR seats were in effect. 
Women’s organizations such as the “Women’s Alliance for the 17th General Election” (sip-
chil-dae chongsuneul wihan yeosung yeondae), which is composed of 32 women’s organizations, 
played a critical role in the process of adopting the quotas. They also contributed to 
amending the Political Fund Act to mandate that 10 percent of the government subsidies to 
political parties should be spent on parties’ efforts and programs to support women’s 
political engagement (W.-H. Kim 2008; Korea Women Parliamentarians Network 2013; Y.-I. 
Lee 2015). The major party leadership, however, shared with me their frustration and 
disillusionment with the women’s movement. According to them, the former activists who 
were elected to the PR positions through the gender quotas did not work closely with the 
political party’s women’s bureau nor strongly advocate for advancing women’s 
representation in the parties or in the Assembly. The interviewees argued that the women 
who entered the political arena through gender quotas have not made a difference; “what 
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have the PR women done for women?” The interviewees asked me. Some of other 
interviewees also echoed similar negative evaluations on women legislators throughout the 
fieldwork. When I raised the question of women’s contribution to the Assembly or 
interviewees’ views on female legislators, negative assessments were returned. Are these 
evaluations fair?  
 Some female legislators intentionally distance themselves from feminist issues 
including measures to nominate and elect more women: in order to be an “insider,” some 
women want to appear as more “serious” and “objective” legislators, not as a narrowly 
defined “female legislators.” This causes hostilities among female legislators, as some feel 
“betrayed” by their female peers. Also, the interviews reveal that there are at least three 
divisions among different groups of  women: 1) between women’s movements and women’s 
bureaus in major political parties (and minor parties are neglected), 2) among female 
legislators, and 3) among women’s movements by their ideological orientation. I argue that 
women’s status as a political minority hinders realizing women’s substantive representation 
through the collective action among women and men sharing the cause of  women’s political 
empowerment.  
 
Theories on Substantive Representation 
Meaning of Substantive Representation 
 
Do female legislators stand up and act for women? Does electing more women to the 
legislature lead to more women-friendly policies proposed? A longstanding and highly 
contested debate about the impact of  women’s presence in politics is critical, as the 
justification of  political empowerment of  women is partly dependent on the answer to these 
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questions. Hanna Pitkin’s The Concept of  Representation (1967) is one of  the earliest attempts to 
explore the meaning of  representation. Pitkin discussed four views on representation: 
formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and 
substantive representation. Pitkin’s discussion of  representation has provided a conceptual 
framework for subsequent studies, which applied, expanded, and challenged each view on 
representation. More importantly, various analyses have tried to find a relationship between 
these four aspects of  representation, especially how an increased level of  descriptive 
representation of  women promotes their substantive representation. 
 Descriptive representation implies that “the composition of  representative 
institutions should mirror the composition of  the represented in important respects” 
(Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 408). Descriptive representatives are “individuals who in 
their own backgrounds mirror some of  the more frequent experiences and outward 
manifestations of  belonging to the group” (Mansbridge 1999, 628). They are considered to 
represent the represented not only because of  their “visible characteristics” which define 
their group [e.g. gender or race/ethnicity] but also because of  their [assumed] “shared 
experiences” (Mansbridge 1999, 629). The descriptive representatives are expected to bring 
in the collective opinion of  their groups, therefore, the legislative can reflect the opinion of  
the entire electorate (Pitkin 1967).   
 The substantive view of  representation had not been explicitly discussed before 
Hanna Pitkin (1967). Different from the other three views on representation, substantive 
representation theorists pay attention to what a representative does for the represented 
(Pitkin 1967). According to Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler (2005), “the most 
common interpretation is that substantive representation refers to policy responsiveness or 
the extent to which representatives enact laws and implement policies that are responsive to 
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the needs or demands of  citizens” (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 409). Only can this 
substantive view provide criteria to assess if  one is a good or bad representative; a criterion 
which is missing in the other views of  representation (Pitkin 1967).  
 The most often studied view of  representation is arguably descriptive representation 
and its effect on substantive representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Challenging 
Pitkin’s argument that descriptive representation does not guarantee the representatives to 
act for the represented (Pitkin 1967), a number of  studies have provided empirical evidence 
that many female legislators do feel an obligation to represent women constituents and 
prioritize women-friendly agendas in their legislative portfolios, and having more women in 
legislatures leads to more policy responsiveness to women (Bratton and Ray 2002; Caiazza 
2004; S. Carroll 2000; Childs 2002; Crowley 2004; J. Dolan 1998; Inter-Parliamentary Union 
2008; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Saint-Germain 1989; Schulze 2013; Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler 2005; Swers 2013; Tamerius 1995; S. Thomas and Welch 1991).  
 
Descriptive Model and Constituency Model  
How do the representatives understand what the represented want? In other words, how can 
we measure substantive representation? Regarding factors affecting lawmakers’ legislative 
priorities, existing literature presents two competing models, namely the descriptive 
representation model and the constituency model. The descriptive representation model 
stresses the importance of  legislators’ experiences in determining one’s legislative behaviors, 
thus factors such as gender and race affect the legislative behaviors (Bratton and Haynie 
1999). In measuring substantive representation, existing studies have operationalized the 
concept in various ways: measures such as bill initiation and passage related to women, 
families, and children (Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003; S. Thomas 1991), roll-call voting 
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records on women’s issues bills (Swers 1998), and spending in areas related to women 
(Schulze 2013; Towns 2003).  
 However measured, studies have demonstrated that women’s descriptive 
representation is related to higher level of  women’s substantive representation. Studies based 
in the U.S. show that legislators’ gender is a strong predictor of  supporting women-friendly 
policies in the House of  Representatives. This gender difference in bill sponsorship activities 
still remains even after controlling the factor of  district and political party affiliation (Bratton 
and Haynie 1999). Similarly, women are more likely to introduce WFB to the floor than their 
male predecessors who are from the same party representing the same district during the 
104th – 107th U.S. House of  Representatives, even after for controlling party affiliation and 
the voters’ opinions on the gender issues in his/her districts (Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 
2007).   
 Empirical studies have shown that many female legislators do feel obligated to 
represent women constituents and prioritize women-friendly agendas in their legislative 
portfolios, and having more women in legislatures leads to more policy responsiveness to 
women. Even conservative female legislators in the UK and Australia take more liberal 
stances on “morality politics” issues such as reproductive rights and same-sex marriage 
(Plumb 2016). According to this model, therefore, the gender identity of  a legislator is a 
meaningful indicator of  one’s legislative priorities, and electing more women to the 
legislature will lead to more women-friendly laws proposed (if  not passed). Female House 
members sponsored more social welfare and feminist issue bills compared to their male 
predecessors or successors of  their districts, which provides a strong support for the 
descriptive representation over the constituency model (MacDonald and O’Brien 2011). 
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 Childs and Krook (2012) examined mandate effects and label effects to analyze how 
women’s path to election (through quotas vs. non quotas) adds to or influences the pressure 
they may experience in representing women as representatives. Mandate effect refers to 
citizens’ and legislators’ expectation that women who were elected after the gender quotas 
would promote women’s interests more so than the women elected prior to the quotas. Label 
effect means that gender quotas stigmatize the legislators who were elected when the gender 
quotas are in effect, as they were perceived to have been elected more through quotas rather 
than merits (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012, 11). Analyzing the female legislators 
affiliated with the Labor Party of  United Kingdom, they concluded that female legislators 
gradually overcome the initial label effect as they accumulate experience, and the stigma of  
being quota women wanes, thus empowering them to act on behalf  of  women (Childs and 
Krook 2012).  
 The descriptive model, however, cannot explain why some male legislators support 
and propose bills on issues traditionally associated with women’s rights. Moreover, not all 
female legislators identify themselves as “women’s representatives” nor focus exclusively on 
women-friendly issues in their legislative agendas; other factors such as legislators’ age, 
districts’ characteristics, and legislative committee membership affect the total number of  
WFB introduced by each member (Barnello and Bratton 2007; Bratton and Haynie 1999). 
Moreover, even when women legislators state their interests in proposing gender-equality 
bills, electoral rules, the culture of  parliaments, and party affiliation make it hard for female 
legislators follow their stated interests in promoting women’s interests. Childs and Krook 
(2006) argue that the number of  women in national legislatures is a weak predictor of  
women-friendly policy outcomes. Rather, presence of  active individual policy entrepreneurs 
who have interests in making women-friendly policy gains can be a better predictor of  
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women’s substantive representation (Childs and Krook 2006). Having the sufficient number 
of  female legislators with feminist leanings and working in a supportive environment for 
gender-parity ideas facilitate female legislators to push WFB (Grey 2006).   
 Legislators’ seat type and electoral systems also influence legislative activities: 
legislators elected to the multi-member districts are more active in promoting women’s 
issues than SMD members. This can be explained by the SMD members’ need to manage 
districts, therefore they want to appeal to a broader range of voters instead of presenting 
themselves to be an advocate of narrowly-defined “women’s issues” (Clark and Caro 2013). 
Moreover, “women” is not a homogenous group, therefore differences between women 
(Brown 2014; Celis et al. 2008) and “non-left, non-feminist and male MP’s role in women’s 
substantive representation” should be also considered (Celis and Erzeel 2015, 45).  
 The constituency model, however, hypothesizes that lawmakers consider the 
prospects of  re-election, thus variables such as preferences of  districts they represent or 
their parties’ issue concerns determine their legislative behaviors. Susan Carroll (2000) 
argued that female legislators’ personal support for women-friendly policies could not always 
affect their legislative activities, due to the differences between the ideological orientation of  
their districts and that of  their own. Congresswomen whose districts do not share the same 
ideological views on certain women-related issues, “very clearly experienced a ‘tug and pull’ 
between their own preferences and those of  their district” (S. Carroll 2000, 9).  
 
Gender Stereotypes 
From these insights, some researchers have examined how factors such as race or gender 
interact with party affiliation, and how party’s reputation and association with strengths or 
weaknesses in certain issues mediate female legislators’ capacities to work to push women-
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related policy agenda. Also, voters assume that female candidates are better at handling 
“feminine issues” such as social security, welfare, or education, while male candidates are 
expected to be better at handling “masculine” issues such as crime, economic growth, 
security, or foreign affairs. In terms of  political ideology, liberal parties are assumed to be 
more capable of  handling these “feminine” issues, while conservative parties are considered 
to be apt to address “masculine” issue areas (Genovese 2013; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 
2003; Murray 2010b; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Swers 2013). These gender stereotypes interact 
with party stereotypes and affect voters’ evaluation of  political candidates, not only in 
legislative elections but also in executive elections, and legislators are aware of  these 
gendered expectations from the voters.  
 For example, Miguel’s study shows that Brazilian female legislators are less successful 
in their legislative initiatives than their male colleagues, and women tend to focus on social 
justice issues when men do on the economy and infrastructure (Miguel 2012). In the U.S., 
the Republican women do not gain as much as Democratic women when focusing on 
women’s issues due to the party’s general stance on women-related issues. On the other 
hand, the Republican Party’s reputation as being strong on the national defense issues can 
ameliorate female legislators’ perceived weakness in this “masculine” areas, thus benefitting 
the Republican women when they act on these issues (Swers 2013). Some studies focusing 
on the South Korean case have supported the claim that women and male legislators have 
different policy priorities. Female legislators have expressed their interests in issues related to 
women, family, and welfare (W.-H. Kim, Lee, and Kim 2007), and are more active in 
proposing bills on welfare, human rights, education, and women’s issue areas than men (W.-
H. Kim 2011; Korean Women’s Development Institute 2013). Even at the local level, more 
and more bills on welfare and women’s issues were introduced as a share of  women in the 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.93 
 
legislature increased from the 2.2 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2006 (W.-H. Kim, Yang, 
and Jeong 2009).  
 
Status in the Assembly 
Politics is a hierarchical space, as representatives “may differ in terms of  prestige, influence, 
and ability to legislate successfully” (Miguel 2012, 104), which makes a difference in 
legislators’ productivity, such as bill passage records. Miguel argued “women still face barriers 
in reaching high-status positions in the field of  politics, and their effectiveness is therefore 
limited” (Miguel 2012, 104). However, the legislators’ prestige and social capital is distributed 
not only along the gender line but also by the path to office. Examining Ugandan women 
MPs, Goetz (2002) suggest that the paths to power can influence substantive representation. 
Ugandan female legislators elected to the reserved seats bypass direct elections and selected 
by a patronage system. Thus their effectiveness in promoting a gender-equity agenda was 
low as “they [the women MPs] have not institutionalized a presence for themselves as 
legitimate” (Goetz 2002, 573).   
 Similarly, a study on three East Asian countries’ mixed electoral system and its 
impact on legislators’ behaviors shows how legislators won their seats can influence their 
legislative behaviors. According to Rich (2012), an invisible hierarchy exists between single 
member district members (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) members in South 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The SMD members are regarded to be more prestigious than PR 
members, as they are chosen directly by the voters unlike PR members who are elected 
through closed party lists. This grants SMD members more legitimacy in their legislative 
activities (Rich 2012). Hierarchy between SMD and PR members in Korea, however, seems 
to make a difference in terms of  the bill passage rate rather than the number of  bills 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.94 
 
sponsored. In the 17th Assembly, PR members introduced 26 percent of  total bills when the 
share of  PR members is only 19 percent of  the total seats. However, SMD members fared 
better than their PR peers in terms of  the bill passage rate (Lee 2009). 
 Analyzing the bills initiated by legislators in the 16th and the 17th Assemblies of  
Korea, Min-jeong Kim also found that PR and SMD members had different issue foci (M. 
Kim 2011), even though she did not elaborate on the reasons or the patterns. However, the 
PR members and SMD members might have different policy interests even before getting 
elected, because PR candidates tend to be selected from professional and vocational 
associations. Or, PR women may feel obligations to represent women because they are 
“beneficiaries” of  gender quotas, or conversely the PR women may seek not to focus on 
women’s issues in order to avoid stigma (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). During my 
interview, only few identify themselves as legislators working to stand up for women’s issues, 
and they emphasized that gender is not a strong factor in their legislative activities: Rep. 
Myung Shin and Rep. Hunjoo Min seemed to be the only one; the others avoided 
emphasizing their gender, such as Interviewee #26 and Rep. Kwon Eun-hee of  the 
Democratic Party, whose staffers declined my interview request as, they argued, she was not 
elected because she was a woman.  
 Interestingly, the district factor has a meager impact on South Korean lawmakers’ 
legislative activities. Interviewing legislators and their congressional staffs in the 17th 
Assembly, Jang-Su Kim (2006) argued that legislators perceive initiating bills to be ineffectual 
to their electoral prospects in the following election cycle. As very few people pay close 
attention to what kind of  bills their district representatives introduce (J.-S. Kim 2006), the 
SMD members instead focus their resources on organizing and attracting support from their 
districts and assuming leadership positions in parties or legislature (Lee 2009).  
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 Regardless of  the contents of  the bills, a party’s relationship with the executive office 
influences the number of  bills introduced by each legislator. In South Korea, the ruling party 
members have a communication channel with the executive office, or the party-government 
council, through which they express some of  their legislative agendas. On the other hand, 
Assembly members from the opposition parties lack this direct access for them to negotiate 
with the government. Therefore, the members from the opposition party tend to propose 
the higher number of  bills to the legislature compared to their counterparts in the ruling 
party (Kim 2006, Lee 2009 and the interview with #3). During the 17th Assembly, for 
example, members from the ruling party proposed 43.3 percent of  all the bills while 56.7 
percent of  the bills were introduced by the legislators from the opposition parties (Lee 
2009).  
 Comparing French deputies by age, profession, and experience, no gender gap 
surfaced in contributions to plenary sessions, the number of questions asked, or 
contributions to committees (Murray 2012). Women are as active and involved as men in the 
legislature. However, she acknowledges other factors including seniority, prior experience in 
the National Assembly affect the level of  involvement and the types of  activities the 
deputies undertake (Murray 2012):  
those who have been in the National Assembly longer are less likely to ask 
high numbers of  questions. This may be because asking questions is a 
relatively simple task that does not require much seniority, while those with 
more experience may be more involved in demanding tasks, such as 
authoring reports and bills (Murray 2012, 37).  
In South Korea, seniority has a negative relationship with the number of  bills legislators 
sponsor, unlike in the United States. As most of  PR members are the newcomers to the 
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Assembly, the factor of  seniority may partly explain the productivity gaps between PR and 
SMD members (Lee 2009).  In sum, the existing literature present two competing theories 
explaining which factors influence legislative activities: the descriptive representation model 
and the constituency model. This current study tests which theory better explains how and 
when women’s interests are represented.  
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The current study is to compare the strengths of  the descriptive representative model and 
the constituency model in explaining who proposes WFB. I examine how strong an effect 
gender is on the legislators’ activities, to answer the consequences of  promoting women to 
the position, and if  having more gender diversity in the Assembly leads to more legislative 
activities related to women. I also explore how individual-level factors such as gender, party 
affiliation, committee membership, seat type, and seniority affect legislators’ women-related 
bill sponsorship activities. Different from some of  the previous studies, I examined not only 
the female legislators’ legislative activities but focused on all the legislators to see who claim 
and advance women’s substantive representation (following Celis et al. 2008).  
 I conducted three sets of  analysis to assess the effects of  various factors on women-
related bill sponsorship activities. First, I examined women’s WFB legislative activities. I 
compared PR women’s legislative activities to SMD women’s, to see the effect of  seat type 
controlling for the effect of  legislators’ gender. And then, I tracked the female legislators’ 
legislative activities who served more than one term, first as a PR member and then later as 
an SMD member11, another way to control for the effect of  gender and other personal 
                                                     
11 One female legislator, Rep. Myung-sook Han, served three terms, first as a PR then as an SMD and lastly as a 
PR. Serving more than one term as a PR is unusual, but she was the leader of her party and placed her name on 
the party PR candidate slate – which is an exception.  
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characteristics and see the effect of  the seat type. Second, I compared male and female SMD 
members who were elected from the same district, to control the effect of  district factor and 
check the effect of  the legislators’ gender. If  the constituency model holds – which reveals 
the effect of  constituents’ preferences in forming legislators – there will be no significant 
differences in women and men from the same district in terms of  the number of  WFB. If  
legislators’ gender identity is a significant factor, as the descriptive model argues, then I will 
see a gender gap in legislative portfolio. The first comparison is to compare the effect of  the 
seat type on the women-related bill sponsorship activities, whereas the second analysis 
compares the effect of  the gender while controlling for the district factors, as both men and 
women emerged from the same district. Lastly, I ran a statistical model including all the 
legislators who were elected between 2000 and 2016 to assess the effect of  each variable 
controlling for the effects of  other variables.  
 I hypothesize that female legislators are more likely to propose WFB than men are, 
and legislators from liberal parties are more likely to support WFB than those from 
conservative parties (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 2013), based on the constituency 
model. Comparing legislative activities of  male and female legislators who are elected from 
the same districts in the different time, thus controlling the effect of  district, I hypothesize 
that the female members are still more likely to propose WFB than their male predecessors 
or successors who emerge from the same district. I also expect that the PR members will be 
more active in promoting women’s issue bills than their SMD counterparts. Political parties 
recruited the PR members to appeal to a wide range of  voters, thus the PR women in 
general are expected to have stronger interests in women’s issues than SMD members. As 
some studies focusing on South Korea demonstrated, PR members on average propose the 
higher number of  bills than SMD members. The influence of  the seat type on the legislative 
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behavior is analyzed as well. Lastly, being a member of  either the Health, Welfare, and 
Family legislative committee or the Gender Equality legislative committee will increase the 
likelihood of  proposing WFB.  
H1 - PR members are more likely to propose WFB than SMD members.  
H2 - Men with the Democratic Party or the Labor Party affiliation are more 
likely to propose WFB than women from the Saenuri or Freedom 
Advancement Party.  
H3 - Members of  the opposition parties are more likely to propose bills (but 
not necessarily WFB).  
H4 - The number of  terms a legislator serves has a positive correlation with 
the likelihood of  proposing WFB.   
 
Data, Variables, and Research Methods 
I examined legislative activities of  all members of  the National Assembly, including those 
elected through by-elections, from the 16th to 19th Assemblies (2000-2016). I analyzed 1289 
members’ legislative activities from June 2000 to May 2012. From February 1998 to late 
February 2008 (when president starts his/her term), the center-left Democratic Party sent 
two presidents to the presidential office. Thus, during the 16th and the 17th Assemblies, 
legislators from the Democratic Party are marked as members of  the ruling party. From late 
February of  2008 to February of  2013, the president was from the Grand National Party 
(currently the Saenuri Party), thus the members from this party who served in the 18th and 
the 19th Assemblies are coded as the ruling party members.  
 I reviewed the entire bill proposals uploaded on the Bill Tracking Database offered 
by the Korean National Assembly (The National Assembly Information System n.d.). I read 
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through the titles of  the bills, the rationale for the proposal, and the main features of  the 
bills. I chose bills related to the following eight categories: 1) pregnancies, childbirth, 
childcare, and maternity and paternity leave; 2) participation in decision making bodies and 
political empowerment of  women; 3) women’s labor participation and unemployment, and 
women’s entrepreneurship; 4) domestic violence, sexual harassment and sexual violence; 5) 
human trafficking and prostitution; 6) gender sensitivity budgeting and raising awareness 
(gender budgeting, changing sexist customs and legal terms); 7) protecting minorities (lost 
children, girls, immigrant women, women in fisheries and agriculture, etc.); 8) others 
(organizing new administrative bodies in charge of  gender equality issues, etc.).  
 These categories are selected based on the reports by the Gender Equality and 
Family Committee of  the National Assembly on assessment of  the Convention on the 
Elimination of  All forms of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) published in 2011 
(W.-H. Kim et al. 2011). I also modified categories to fit the bills I reviewed. In classifying 
the bills, some bills could have been included in more than one category. In that case, I read 
the features and motivation for the bill proposal and picked the category which best 
describes and characterizes the bill. I also included bills aiming to address gender inequality 
disadvantaging men, such as encompassing the subjects of  victims of  sexual harassment and 
violence from only women to include both men and women, adopting paternity leave 
policies, or expanding government benefits for single mothers to single fathers. However, I 
excluded bills constraining women’s rights. Even though some researchers argue against pre-
selecting issues for studying substantive representation (Celis 2013; Celis and Childs 2012), I 
decided to use the CEDAW guideline as a proxy to WFB, as it is a guideline against which 








I analyzed all the legislators’ bill sponsorship record, not only women’s. The total number of  
bills sponsored by legislators has increased over the years, not only the bills related to women 
(Table 4.1.).  Legislators in the 16th Assembly introduced 1,890 bills; 6,106 in the 17th, and 
11,564 bills during the 18th Assembly, and 15806 during the 19th Assembly. This shows the 
shift of  influence from the executive branch to the legislative branch, and its gain in more 
checks and balances against the presidency and bureaucracy (Korean Women’s Development 
Institute 2013).   
 I sorted out women’s issue bills, excluding the ones proposed by the same person but 
to the different committees. The total number of  1029 women’s issues bills proposed 
between 2000 and 2016 were subject to the final analysis. The total of  1289 legislators were 
included in the analysis, which encompass all the members elected between 2000 and 2016. I 
referred to three volumes of  Kuk-Hoi Sa (the Reference of  the National Assembly History) 
published by the National Assembly to obtain the list of  legislators (National Assembly of  
the Republic of  Korea 2012, 2014). For the 19th Assembly, I complemented National 
Assembly database with news article search to find out the committee assignment.  
 
Statistical Model - Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) 
Dependent Variable  
 
The dependent variable is the number of  women’s issue bills a legislator proposed in each 
four-year legislative session. The average number of  WFB a legislator proposed in each 
legislative session is 0.8 (s.d. 2.02). Seventy percent of  the legislators, or 901 members, did 
not propose any WFBs, and 200 legislators (15.5 percent) proposed one bill. Two legislators 
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initiated 20 WFBs in one session, which is the highest number of  bills proposed by a 
legislator. In the 16th Assembly, the total of  57 women’s issue bills were proposed by 34 
members, and 93 percent of  men (271 out of  293) and 43 percent of  women (10 out of  23) 
did not propose any WFBs. In the 17th Assembly, 313 WFB were proposed by 101 members, 
but 72.3 percent of  men (203 out of  279) and 17 percent of  women (8 out of  43) never 
proposed WFBs. In the 18th Assembly, 258 WFB were proposed by 132 legislators: 65.7 
percent of  men (188 out of  285) and 23.9 percent of  women (11 women out of  45) never 
proposed women friendly bills. In the 19th Assembly, 297 WFB were proposed by 111 
members, and 21 women out of  53 and 190 men out of  269 have never proposed WFBs 
(Table 4.1.).   
 This shows that the number of  men and women proposing WFB increases over 
time; however, the share of  WFBs to the total number of  bills proposed to the Assembly 
has not increased significantly, except for a bump on the 17th Assembly. Between 2004 and 
2008, which coincide with the progressive presidency, more than 80 percent of  women 
legislators proposed at least one WFB. During this session, the absolute number and the 
share of  WFB is the highest among the four sessions reviewed.  
Table 4.1. The Number of WFB Proposed to the National Assembly, 2000-2016 
Session Total number of  WFB/total 
number of  bills proposed 
(%) 
Male legislators with 0 
WFB/total number of  
male legislators (%) 
Female legislators with 0 
WFB/total number of  
female legislators (%) 
16th (2000-2004) 57/1890 (3%) 271/293 (92%) 10/23 (43%) 
17th (2004-2008) 313/6106 (5%) 203/279 (73%) 8/43 (19%) 
18th (2008-2012) 258/11564 (2%) 188/285 (66%) 11/45 (24%) 
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Independent Variables   
The independent variables are 1) the sex of  a legislator; 2) liberal party affiliation; 3) the seat 
type (PR vs. SMD); 4) a dummy variable for the membership in either the Health or the 
Gender Equality committee; 5) the seniority; and 6) liberal party affiliation. All the data on 
these variables are available in the National Election Commission database (Korean National 
Election Commission 2016). To examine the effect of  each variable on the number of  
women’s issue bills, I analyzed the data using the Negative Binomial Regression Model 
(NBRM), a type of  count models. The data had over-dispersion, thus NBRM is a better 
choice than the Poisson Regression Model (NRM) (Long and Freese 2006). Even though 
901 observations, or 70 percent, of  the observations are 0s, diagnostic tests show NBRM is a 
better choice over the zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression model for all four 
Assembly cycles.  
 As seen in Table 4.2., women comprise of  13 percent of  the national legislators 
served between 2000 and 2016, and 20 percent of  the legislators are PR members. About 43 
percent of  the elected were affiliated with liberal parties, including 525 members from the 
Democratic Party and 28 members from the Democratic Labor Party; 650 members from 
the conservative Saenuri Party (even though its name has changed frequently) and 39 
members from more conservative Freedom Forward Party. Thirty-three members are 
affiliated with other minor parties, and 14 members are independent members with no party 
affiliation. About 20 percent of  the legislators (249 out of  1289) have served on the Women, 
Family and Welfare legislative committee. During each four-year term, membership 
assignments are officially done twice: once in the first year and a shuffle in the 3rd year. Not 
all legislators stay in the same committee throughout; some leave and some join different 
committees during the term. To simplify the analysis, I counted legislators as a member of  a 
committee, regardless of  length of  tenure.  
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 The legislators serve 1.89 terms on average. Around 52 percent of  them were the 
first term legislators, 24 percent of  them were the second-term legislators, and 14 percent 
serving the third term, with the longest serving legislator with 9 terms. But, those who serve 
multiple terms between 2000 and 2016 are counted more than once. For example, a person 
who served for the first time in 2000 and reelected in 2004 will be counted as a first-time 
legislator in the 16th and a second-term legislator in the 17th Assembly (Table 4.2.) 
Table 4.2. Summary of the Variables (16th - 19th Assemblies) 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Legislative Session 1289 17.51 1.11 16 19 
Female 1289 0.13 0.33 0 1 
PR 1289 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Liberal Party 1289 0.43 0.5 0 1 
Women, Family, and 
Welfare Committee 
1289 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Number of  Term 1289 1.89 1.2 1 9 
Number of  WFB  1289 0.8 2.02 0 20 
Ruling Party Member 1289 0.51 0.5 0 1 
Opposition Party 
Member 
1289 0.49 0.5 0 1 
Party Saenuri Party: 650, Dem: 525, Labor: 28, Freedom Forward: 39, Other minor 
parties: 33, Independent: 14 
 
 
Findings and Discussions 
Overall Trend 
As the number of  female legislators increased, they became more actively involved in the 
legislative activities. From the 1st Assembly to the 11th Assembly, only one or two women 
proposed bills in each Assembly. In the 15th Assembly, however, 10 out of  12 female 
legislators (83 percent) initiated bills, and 18 out of  21 women (88 percent) did in the 16th 
Assembly (Korean Women’s Development Institute 2013), and women and men do not have 
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a statistically significant differences in the total number of  bills they sponsor (Lee 2009). 
Even though still small in number, female legislators have been more and more active in 
their legislative activities. During the first half  of  the 16th Assembly, male legislators 
sponsored 691 bills (93 percent of  total) while women did only 51 bills (7 percent). In the 
first half  of  the 17th Assembly, however, men sponsored 2484 (79 percent of  total) bills and 
women did 666 bills (21%). During the first half  of  the 18th Assembly, men proposed 5,050 
bills (83 percent) and women initiated 1,005 bills (17 percent) (W.-H. Kim 2011).  
 As the number of  female legislators increased, the legislative committee membership 
of  the female legislators diversified. During the 16th Assembly, five standing legislative 
committees did not have a single female member; during the 18th Assembly, however, all the 
committees had at least one female legislator. This enabled female legislators’ input in more 
diverse issues and in decision-making bodies (W.-H. Kim 2011). 
 First, I reviewed who proposed women’s issue bills in each Assembly cycle. More 
than 70 percent of  the legislators did not propose any WFB (Figure 4.1.), which moves the 
mean and distribution of  the data hard to analyze. Therefore, I only included those who 
proposed at least one women’s issue bills in plotting the box plots (Figure 4.3.). As the plots 
below show, the average number of  women’s issue bills in the 16th Assembly is lower than 
that of  the later three sessions, when the share of  women is the lowest among the four; 
however, the total number of  bills proposed during the session is the lowest among the four 
sessions examined, and the share of  WFB to the total number of  bills proposed is even 
slightly higher than the 18th and the 19th Assemblies.  
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.105 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The Number of WFB by Legislators, 2000-2016 
Women are on average more active in proposing WFB. Only 30 percent of  women never 
proposed any WFB whereas more than 70 percent of  men did not. Also, the person with the 
highest number of  WFB proposed is a woman, and the average number of  WFB per person 
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Figure 4.2. The Number of WFB by Legislators by Gender, 2000-2016 
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Table 4.3. Top Two Legislators with the Highest Number of WFB Proposed 
Legislative Session 1st Ranked Legislator 2nd Ranked Legislator 
16th Session  
(2000-2004) 
(B)* Rep. Hong-shin Kim (Male, 
PR, Saenuri) 
Rep. Jeong-sook Kim (Female, 
PR, Saenuri) 
(A) Rep. Kyung-cheon Kim (Female, 
SMD, Democratic) 
17th Session  
(2004-2008) 
(D) Rep. Kye-kyung Lee 
(Female, PR, Saenuri) 
(C) Rep. Myung-ok Ahn (Female, PR, 
Saenuri) 
18th Session  
(2008-2012) 
(F) Rep. Choon-jin Kim (Male, 
SMD, Democratic) 
(E) Rep. Sang-hee Kim (Female, PR, 
Democratic) 
Rep. Young-hee Choi (Female, PR, 
Democratic) 
19th Session  
(2012-2016) 
(H) Rep. In-soon Nam (Female, 
PR, Democratic) 
(G) Rep. Seung-hee Yoo (Female, SMD, 
Democratic) 
*(A), (B), etc. represents the letters in Figure 4.3. 
  
 Interestingly, the two legislators who proposed five WFBs in the 16th Assembly, thus 
the most active proponents of  women’s issues, were PR members from the conservative 
Saenuri Party. A female SMD member from the Democratic Party ranked 3rd in the number 
of  women-friendly bill sponsorship in that cycle. During the 17th Assembly, the top four 
legislators who proposed the highest number of  women’s issue bills were women, and 
among them three were affiliated with the conservative party. Interestingly, the legislator who 
proposed the highest number of  women friendly bills in the 18th Assembly was a male 
Democratic SMD legislator. In the 19th Assembly the top two legislators who were the most 
active proponents of  women’s bills are from the Democratic Party, one an SMD and the 
other PR members. This implies that ideological leanings of  parties are a weak predictor of  
women-friendly legislative activities of  lawmakers, and women’s issue is not a clear partisan 
issue. Also, even though PR members tend to be more active than SMD members in 
women-friendly bill sponsorship, there are some SMD policy entrepreneurs who do not 
share the expected characteristics of  women-friendly legislators (Table 4.3.).  
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 Reviewing the backgrounds of  these top eight legislators who proposed the highest 
number of  WFBs, their legislative activities are not surprising. All six female legislators 
already had strong credentials in women’s movement and were leaders of  women’s 
movement before becoming the legislators. For example, Rep. Kyung-cheon Kim ((A) in 
Figure 4.3.) was the head of  the YWCA; Rep. Jeong-sook Kim (B) was the director of  the 
Korean Girl Scouts and the president of  the KNCW. Rep. Myung-ok Ahn was a 
gynecologist and Rep. Kye-kyung Lee was the founder of  the Women News, the first 
feminist newspaper in Korea. Rep. Seung-hee Yoo was the former head of  Women’s Bureau 
of  the Democratic Party. Two male legislators, Rep. Hong-shin Kim and Rep. Choon-jin 
Kim were well-known figures in the liberal circle.12 Therefore, legislators’ career and 
commitment before joining the Assembly can be a strong predictor of  their legislative 
portfolio (Figure 4.3.).  
 Next, I reviewed the kind of  bills proposed in each legislative session (Table 4.4.). 
Overall, bills related to childbirth, childcare, and maternity/paternity leaves were the most 
frequently proposed (28 percent), followed by bills addressing domestic and sexual violence 
(23 percent). Notably, most of  women’s issue bills were on domestic and sexual violence in 
the 18th Assembly (34.82 percent). This may, in part, be due to sexual violence against young 
                                                     
12 Rep. Kyung-cheon Kim http://www.siminsori.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=75310 
Rep. Hong-shin Kim http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/553876.html 
Rep. Jeong-sook Kim http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/06/03/2015060300119.html; 
http://news.donga.com/ISSUE/Vote2016/News?m=view&date=19980817&gid=7369824 
Rep. Myung-ok Ahn http://www.sisamediin.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=5123 
Rep. Kye-kyung Lee http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000127334 
Rep. Sanghee Kim http://cleankim.kr/intro/story.asp 
Rep. Young-Hee Choi http://weekly.donga.com/List/3/all/11/85076/1 
Rep. Choon-jin Kim http://www.weeklypeople.net/view.do?seq=7702 
Rep. Insoon Nam http://nisoon.co.kr/profile 
Rep. Seung-hee Yoo http://www.yoush.org/page/yooseunghee/ 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.109 
 
girls being reported during these years, shaking the whole nation.13 The increase in legislative 
activities on violence against women can be attributed to the Assembly’s response to the 
strong public opinion demanding actions to address these issues. To deal with the recidivism 
of  sex offenders against young girls, the adoption of  electronic waterproof  ankle bands and 
chemical castration was hotly debated, which resulted in the increased number of  bills 
related to this issue category. 
 
Table 4.4. Number of WFBs by Category and the Legislative Session 
 
Category 16th  17th  18th  19th  Total 
Pregnancy, childbirth, childcare, maternity/paternity leave  












































Gender sensitivity (gender budgeting, changing sexist terms in laws 








Protecting minorities (women in agriculture and fisheries, 
incarcerated women, single parent, immigrants, young girls, women 
















Total 57  317  359  296 1029 
 
                                                     
13 One of the most well-reported (and the most severe) cases, perpetrated by Jo Doo-soon to a 8 year-old girl 
in 2008, was made into a film “Sowon” (which means “Hope” in Korean) in 2013. In 2012, a film “Don’t Cry 
Mommy” was premiered in Korea and was highly watched and talked about.  
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First Analysis: SMD Women vs. PR Women 
 Next, I compared the number of  WFBs initiated by each legislator by gender, party 
ideology, and the seat type (Table 4.5.). On average, conservative women proposed a slightly 
higher number of  WFBs than liberal women, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
For men, seat type and party affiliation do not influence the number of  WFBs. Men do not 
show difference in the number of  WFBs they propose by the seat type and party affiliation. 
For example, liberal men proposed 0.49 WFBs on average while conservative men did 0.39. 
PR men proposed 0.47 WFBs and SMD mem did 0.43 (Table 4.5.). PR women proposed 
significantly more WFB than SMD women, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Women are more active in proposing WFB than their male counterparts sharing the same 
characteristics such as party affiliation or the seat type. For example, liberal women proposed 
2.88 WFB on average while liberal men did only 0.49 bills. However, there is one male 
legislator with liberal party affiliation who proposed 14 WFBs. As discussed earlier, this 
implies that there are policy entrepreneurs in WFB sponsorship activities and some outliers 
skew the distribution of  the observations. In addition, the effect of  gender on the legislative 
outcomes is stronger than other factors. Against the research hypothesis, liberal or 
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Table 4.5. Party Affiliation, Seat Type, Gender and Women-Friendly Bill Initiation 
 
Category Mean S.D Min Max 
Liberal Women (n=85) 2.88 4.05 0 20 
Conservative Women (n=79) 3.75 4.21 0 20 
Liberal Men (n=468) 0.49 1.28 0 14 
Conservative Men (n=657) 0.39 0.90 0 8 
PR Women (n=112) 3.74 4.37 0 20 
SMD Women (n=52) 2.35 3.46 0 17 
PR Men (n=139) 0.47 1.04 0 5 
SMD Men (n=986) 0.43 1.08 0 14 
 
 To further examine the effect of  the seat type on the legislative activities, I compared 
the number of  WFBs among the female legislators who are elected to their SMD seats after 
serving as a PR (Table 4.6.). The findings are mixed. Twenty-three women have served more 
than one term between 2000 and 2016: six women served only as SMD, one woman served 
two terms as a PR member,14 and 16 women have served in both tiers, first as PR and then 
as SMD. Eight women who served for both tiers proposed fewer WFB when they became 
SMD members compared to their PR term; 7 women proposed more WFB as an SMD 
member. One person proposed the same number. Among those who have served only in the 
SMD seat, only one person (Rep. Hee-Jung Kim) proposed more bills in her second term 
SMD, Rep. Hee-Sun Kim propositioned 2 bills in both terms, and others never proposed any 
WFB at all. This suggests that the effect of  the seat type is mixed. PR women who 
benefitted from the gender quotas are not necessarily proactive in their WFB activities. This 
                                                     
14 Rep. Young-Sun Song served two terms as a PR member. She was a PR member of the Saenuri Party in 2004. 
Before the 2008 election, she was nominated by the Pro-Park Party’s PR candidate was elected.  
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finding does not support the constituency theory, as the effect of  having a group of  local 
constituents or not does not influence their WFB activities; SMD women do not seem to be 
affected by their local constituents’ preference of  gender issues, or PR women who entered 
the politics through the gender quotas are not necessarily more active in promoting gender 
issues than SMD members.  
 







Number of  
WFBs 
Difference 
Choo, MiAe 16 SMD 0 0 
 
18 SMD 0   
  19 SMD 0   
Han, MyungSook 16 PR 2 0 
 
17 SMD 2 
 
 
19 PR 0 
 
Jeon, JaeHee 16 PR 1 1 
 
17 SMD 2 
 
 
18 SMD 0 
 
Jeon, YeoOck 17 PR 1 1 
 
18 SMD 2 
 
Jin, SooHee 17 PR 6 -4 
 
18 SMD 2 
 
Jo, BaeSook 16 PR 3 1 
 
17 SMD 4 
 
Jung, MiGyung 18 SMD 0 0 
  19 SMD 0   
Kim, EulDong 18 PR 2 -1 
 
19 SMD 1 
 
Kim, HeeJung 17 SMD 2 7 
  19 SMD 9   
Kim, HeeSun 16 SMD 2 0 
  17 SMD 2   
Kim, HyunMi 17 PR 5 -5 
 
19 SMD 0 
 
Kim, SangHee 18 PR 13 -2 
 
19 SMD 11 
 
Kim, YoungJoo 17 PR 1 -1 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.113 
 
 
19 SMD 0 
 
Kim, YoungSun 16 PR 0 2 
 
17 SMD 2 
 
 
18 SMD 5 
 
Lee, HyeHoon 17 SMD 0 0 
  18 SMD 
 
  
Lee, MiGyung 16 PR 3 -2 
 
17 SMD 1 
 
 
18 SMD 1 
 
 
19 SMD 0 
 
Na, GyungWon 17 PR 4 -3  
18 SMD 1 
 
 
19 SMD 1 
 
Park, GeunHye 16 SMD 0 0 
  17 SMD 0   
  18 SMD 0   
  19 SMD 0   
Park, SoonJa 17 PR 3 4 
 
18 SMD 7 
 
Park, YoungSun 17 PR 1 1 
 
18 SMD 2 
 
 
19 SMD 1 
 
Sim, SangJung 17 PR 3 -2 
 
19 SMD 1 
 
Song, YoungSun 17 PR 1 0 
  18 PR 1   
Yoo, SeungHee 17 PR 7 10 
 
19 SMD 17 
 
 
Second Analysis: Men and Women SMD Members from the Same District 
Another way to examine the constituency theory and the descriptive theory is to compare 
the number of  WFBs proposed by men and women who were elected in the same district – 
there are 28 districts which elected both men and women between 2000 and 2016. Some 
districts elected more than two women; some elected women first and then men; and some 
districts elected women after they had male legislators. Among these 28 districts, 19 districts 
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saw more WFBs proposed by the women than by men, and 3 districts saw male legislators 
proposed more WFBs than their female predecessor or successors. Men and women in the 
six districts proposed the same number of  WFBs (Table 4.7.). This suggests the gender of  
the legislators is a strong predictor of  active WFB sponsorship, even controlling for the 
effect of  districts’ constituency factor, thus supporting descriptive representation model over 

























Table 4.7. WFBs Proposed by Men and Women Elected from the Same District 











Gwangmyung male, 0 female, 2 same female, 0 female, 3 + 





male, 0 female, 11 + 
GoyangDeokyang 
  
male, 0 female, 1 + 
GoyangIlsan1 male, 0 female, 2 male, 0 female, 0 + 
GoyangIlsan2 male, 0 female, 2 male, 0 female, 0 + 
GwangjuGwangsan2 
  
male, 0 female, 0 0 





male, 2 female, 2 0 
DaeguDalseong 
  
female, 0 male, 0 0 
DaeguBookgu1 
  
male, 0 female, 0 0 
BusanYeonje male, 0 female, 2 
  
+ 





male, 9 female, 1 - 
SeoulDongdaemun` female, 2 female, 2 male, 0 
 
+ 





male, 0 female, 2 male, 0 + 
SeoulSungbook1 
  
male, 0 female, 17 + 
SeoulSongpa1 
 
male, 2 female, 2 female, 6 + 





male, 0 female, 1 + 
SeoulYongdeungpo1   female, 0 female, 2 female, 0 
 





male, 2 female, 1 male, 0 - 
SeoulJoonglang1 
  
male, 1 female, 6 + 
SungnamJoongwon 
  
male, 6 female, 1 - 
SoowonGwonsun 
 





male, 0 female, 7 male, 1 + 








Third Analysis: Statistical Analysis 
Lastly, I conducted a regression analysis. The main findings of  statistical analysis are 
presented in Table 4.8. Consistent with the other sets of  comparisons, the regression models 
show that being a woman has the biggest positive impact on increasing the number of  
women friendly bills sponsored by legislators. Membership in the legislative committees on 
the women, family, and welfare also proves consequential to increase the number of  WFB 
initiated by legislators. Being a member of  opposition party increases the number of  
women’s issue bills introduced by legislators, even though the coefficient is smaller than that 
of  being a woman or a member of  women, family, or welfare committee. Against the 
hypotheses suggested at the start of  this study, being a PR member does not have statistically 
significant impact on the women-friendly legislative outcomes, and none of  variables 
demonstrated any interaction effect with gender. Thus the interaction terms were dropped in 
















Table 4.8. Regression Analysis of the Effects of Selected Independent Variables on 
Women’s Issues Bill Sponsorship Activities, 2000-2016 










































































N 315 322 330 322 
LR chi2 (5) 46.31 120.94 81.00 106.87 
log L -122.58 -344.30 -411.55 -341.63 
Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significance at p<0.05 
 Based on legislative activities of  all 1289 lawmakers in the 16
th – 19th National 
Assemblies of  South Korea, this quantitative analysis supports the existing theories finding a 
positive relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation. After 
controlling for other variables influencing the legislative outcomes, being a woman is a 
strong predictor of  increasing WFB sponsorship activities. However, one’s committee 
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membership and the status of  one’s party in the government are also influential to determine 
one’s legislative activities related to women-friendly issues. The number of  bills introduced to 
the National Assembly, of  course, is not an exhaustive measure of  women’s substantive 
representation. Examining how many bills ended up being actual policies is also critical. 
Some research has demonstrated that in regard to the success rate of  bill proposals, PR 
members are less fruitful in passing their bills compared to their SMD colleagues in Korea.  
 As Karen Beckwith (2014) argues, however, not all policy attempts translate into 
policy outcomes due to a myriad of  factors such as “political opportunity structure and 
configuration of  party power within, for example, a legislature” (Beckwith 2014, 33). 
Analyzing policy attempts allows the researchers to capture “a difference between representing 
interests and securing interests” (Beckwith 2014, 33; italics in the original). As the analysis in 
this paper has demonstrated, PR members are one of  those who are most active in 
proposing bills. Whatever the reasons for the low passage rate of  bills by PR members may 
be partly personal factors as well as institutional and cultural reasons. If  most of  women’s 
issues bills introduced by PR members do not result in actual policy changes for women, it is 
hard to argue that women’s issues are effectively represented in the lawmaking bodies. Some 
argue assuming leadership positions in the National Assembly helps their proposals passed 
(Yeollin jeongchi yeosung euiwon network 2005, 16); therefore, female legislators should be 
more actively involved in the workings of  the Assembly. 
 Moreover, examining diverse venues and actors of  policy-making process is critical 
to have a more holistic understanding on women’s substantive representation. Won and 
Park’s study on the policy process of  adopting anti-prostitution law in South Korea stressed 
that various actors including not only the legislators but feminist activists, president’s 
initiative, cabinet members, bureaucrats, government officials and media cooperated to get 
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anti-prostitution policies adopted (Won and Park 2006). S. Laurel Weldon also found that 
women’s movements and women’s governmental agencies are more effective venues than 
female legislators to successfully address violence against women (Weldon 2002). In spite of  
these limitations, this quantitative analysis has tested the applicability of  theories on the 
relationship between women’s descriptive representation and substantive representation. 
Why, then, do some political actors not acknowledge female legislators’ contribution? Why 
are PR legislators not more active than their SMD colleagues in promoting WFBs? The 
qualitative analysis in the following section sheds light on this question.  
 
Qualitative Analysis: Lack of Cooperation among Women – the Righteous Women or 
Queen Bees? 
Interviewees I met during my fieldwork shared frustrations over the lack of  cooperation 
among women, disagreement among women’s organizations, and lack of coordination 
between the women’s movement and the political parties/the National Assembly. All of 
these undermine the progress in empowering women politically15 and make it difficult for 
women’s demand to be taken seriously by the establishment, thus presents constraints to 
secure women’s interests in the political parties and the legislature.  
The interviewees said the cooperation among female legislators is generally low. 
There is a partisan difference in the perception; the interviewees of the Saenuri party said the 
female legislators of the Saenuri party were less active in mentoring other female members 
than the Democratic women. On the other hand, when I asked the Democratic women the 
same question, they expressed dissatisfaction with the level of mentoring among the female 
members:  
                                                     
15 The notes on the methodology can be found in Chapter 3.  
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Usually, the female members of my party [the Saenuri] rarely spend time on 
mentoring junior members or the next generation women leaders. For one, 
there is no female legislators from Saenuri with high seniority…When talking 
to female legislators on the individual basis, they said their hands were too 
full to take care of other female legislators. There have been movements like 
the Women’s Network for Clean Politics (malgeun jeongchi yeosung network) 
before the 2004 legislative elections, but the feminist activists were 
disappointed at the female legislators who were elected. The women 
legislators were not as active in promoting women’s interests as the 
movement wished. Therefore, these movements and initiatives are not as 
active as in 2004 anymore [Interviewee #8].  
The interviewee attributed the low level of cooperation among women to female legislators’ 
“disappointing” performance in pursuing women-related policy agenda, which turned off 
feminists who helped them to get elected. Also, the interviewee criticized that the elected 
women tried to avoid being labeled as a woman legislator or acknowledging the gender 
quotas contributing to their election.   
Comraderies among the Saenuri women are very weak, as they have strong 
sense of eliticism and entitlement. The female legislators think they are where 
they are because of their own merit, not because of women’s movement or 
quotas. They do not think they owe to the women’s movement for their 
success, even though their entry to politics is indebted to the 50 percent PR 
gender quotas. They do not think they were elected “as women” or elected 
“for women”, so they do not actively advocate for women’s issues 
[Interviewee #8].  
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Some women distance themselves from women’s agenda. [However], men 
consider these women to be “rational and reasonable,” as they are not 
“biased,” demanding, [nor] difficult. When other women bring the issue of 
women’s interests or political empowerment, these women say they are sick 
of hearing about them! Because these women have strong comraderies with 
other male legislators, they act like “reasonable” and say “we should not talk 
about women’s issues.” These women argue that competitive men lose their 
opportunities due to the demand to recruit more women. There are many 
female legislators acting like this during the 19th assembly session. However, 
you know, when the next election approaches, I am sure these women will 
turn to the Women’s Bureau and ask them to support their candidacy 
[Interviewee #21].  
However, Interviewees #8 and #21 alluded that these female legislators navigate hostile 
environment which makes cooperation among women difficult. They are numerical 
minorities; thus they do not have a strong bargaining power even when they participate in 
the decision making process.  
When it comes to the candidate nomination committee, the party rules 
require to nominate 30 percent of the committee members as women. 
However, these women committee members do not have a strong voice in 
the nomination process nor they usually agree on many issues. When a 
female committee member raises a point on women-related issues, other 
female members do not support her opinion. More than anything else, they 
are numerical minorities in the committee and feel overwhelmed among 
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other male committee members. Women committee members show lower 
level of cooperation, and people say things like “women are their worst 
enemies.” [Interviewee #8]  
 
To promote mentoring and collective action among female legislators, Korea Women 
Parliamentarian Network was established on May 27, 2013. Former and current legislators 
are eligible to join the Network and they need to pay annual membership dues of 
KRW100,000. The goal of the Network is to promote political representation of women 
both in terms of increasing the number and also empowering them to make a real policy 
difference. One of the biggest challenges of the Network, however, is to encourage 
participation from the former and current legislators – the incumbent female legislators all 
say women do not come together and cooperate. An interviewee said that former legislators 
who do not hold office are better at networking and gathering; the incumbents are too busy 
“surviving” their term:  
[When I pointed out that many of the interviewees were not aware of the 
Korea Women Parliamentarian Network] Of course they do not know. 
People are not interested in the group, and the budget of the organization is 
limited. We would like to work on many projects, but we have a limited 
budget. We have only one paid staff and rely on voluntary work by 
researchers. It is difficult to encourage former and current legislators to 
participate…Few months ago, the Network launched a research project 
tracing female legislators’ career trajectory and their paths to the Assembly, 
to find a pattern in their political success. We sent survey questionnaires to 
the legislators but the response rate was disappointingly low. The members 
 
 
Lee, Young-Im, 2017, UMSL, p.123 
 
were worried about their privacy and there were low incentives for 
participating in the survey. Legislators were not interested in the project, and 
did not want to talk about their career. Also, the survey questions were in-
depth, but they did not want to spend too much time answering the 
questions [Interviewee #14]. 
 
Even though women are excluded from the inner circle and do not benefit from nepotism, 
some women are skillful at networking. Some interviewees viewed these women negatively:  
The party organizations do not take women’s organization or movement 
seriously [as they are not a strong voting block or strong mobilization group]. 
Also women’s organizations do not make a strong demand to the political 
parties or the Assembly to demand better representation. The party 
leadership does not need to worry about a backlash even when they ignore 
the demand from women’s movement. Also, having a successful female 
political leader is important but we have not seen any role models. It is 
important to identify key players and stay in good terms, but women are not 
as successful [not because they do not try but the way networking is done is 
masculine, and it is hard to overcome already existing structure]. However 
some women are good at it, and we call them “sunflowers” [because they 
face wherever the “sun” is] [Interviewee #19].    
The coordination and cooperation between the parties and Assembly and the 
women’s movements have been eroded over time. Interviewee #25 said the cooperation 
between the movement and the parties were stronger before the 18th Assembly. However, 
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the 18th Assembly showed high level of partisan polarization and hostility, and it affected the 
relationship among female legislators, and the legislators and the feminist movement.  
This lack of cooperation and distancing themselves from the other women could be 
understood as the Queen Bee syndrome (Derks, Ellemers, et al. 2011; Derks, Van Laar, et al. 
2011). “Queen Bees” are “senior women in masculine organizational cultures who have 
fulfilled their career aspirations by dissociating themselves from their gender while 
simultaneously contributing to the gender stereotyping of other women” (Derks, Ellemers, 
et al. 2011, 519). Queen Bee phenomenon is an outcome, not the cause of, the gender 
discrimination in the workplace, and a survival mechanism some minorities use who are 
working in a hostile environment to their identities. Interviewees often describe other female 
legislators’ behaviors who do not cooperate or groom other women; they evaluate these 
behaviors negatively which even further undermines the prospects of cooperation and 
reinforces the hostile environment against women.  
On the surface, PR female members get along but they are jealous of each 
other. My legislator was one of the first PR members who gained local 
leadership position and other female PR members were very jealous of her. 
Once she resigned from the post other PR members changed their attitude 
and get along. [Are you aware of a network among previous and incumbent 
female members?] I cannot think of any [Interviewee #11].  
 
The 18th Assembly has particularly a lot of conflicts and gridlock in the 
Assembly. The female legislators of the Democratic Party occupied the 
chairperson seat in the Assembly, and there were fierce fistfights in the 
Assembly when the contentious bills were reviewed. Due to the potential 
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accusation of sexual harassment in case male legislators touch female 
legislators, the major parties asked their female legislators to physically 
occupy the chairperson’s seat and grabbed the gavel so male legislators have 
a hard time interfering them. These women even practiced this! So when 
Rep. Yeonhee Choi was fighting over the gavel and the seat, male legislators 
who could not touch her body, fearing accusation of sexual harassment and 
unwanted touch, came to her and flipped her fingers [Interviewee #26].  
 
However, these narratives unknowingly blame women for not meeting two undue 
expectations and overlook structural sexism. First, women are expected to support each 
other and second, those who do not support others and pursue their own success are seen as 
hostile and unfriendly (Derks, Ellemers, et al. 2011, 521).  
Some women do help other women, nevertheless. A study based on senior 
policewomen showed that women with high level of gender identification16 are motivated to 
support other women and provide opportunities for others’ career advancement. 
Interviewee #26 said she felt an obligation not to drop the ball, as she feared her mistakes 
can hinder other women’s advancement. She had supported other junior women and 
recruited women whenever opportunities arise. She recommended and recruited other 
female politicians, such as Rep. Eun-Hye Yoo (the vice spokesperson of the Democratic 
Party) and Rep. Hyun-mi Kim. When the interviewee #26 recruited these other women, she 
emphasized how important it is to pay it forward by working hard and actively recruiting 
other women [Interviewee #26]. However, when women push for a gender balance in the 
                                                     
16 Gender identification is measured by survey questions such as “At work, being a woman is important to me,” 
“I currently feel connected to other women at work,” “At work, I feel part of the group of women,” and “I 
identify with other women at work”(Derks, Van Laar, et al. 2011, 1245).  
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election using their leadership status in their party, they experience a lot of pushback from 
male party members:  
As you know, it is challenging to raise the issue of gender quotas in the party. 
We should be more strategic...in fact during the 19th legislative election, Rep. 
Myung-sook Han (then president of the party) and Rep. Mi-kyung Lee 
worked hard to nominate more women but they were fiercely attacked by 
many male legislators and experienced a backlash after that. So good leaders 
suffer from these attacks…not because Rep. Han was a bad leader but those 
men who did not get nominations under her chairpersonship attacked 
her…so factors like this make it very challenging for the political parties to 
have strong initiatives on gender quotas [Interviewee #27, Rep. Young-Gyo 
Seo].  
 
The lack of cooperation is seen not only at the individual level. The tension between the 
KNCW and the KWCU was palpable in the discussion. There are conflicts among different 
groups with different ideological leanings, strategies, visions, and also personal conflicts. 
One of the former PR legislators shot directly at the chair of the conservative KNCW:  
I would like to ask President Geum-sook Choi of the KNCW…the 
experience has shown us that the bloody fights by the women’s groups were 
fruitful only when the groups banded together in spite of their ideological 
differences. If the KNCW chooses to take a different path and do not 
cooperate with other groups and therefore undermine the effectiveness of 
the movement, I am afraid the KNCW would be subject to the criticism 
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when we do not accomplish the 30 percent candidate gender quotas for 
SMD seats [Interviewee #27, Former Rep. Hye-sung Kim].  
On receiving this criticism, Choi replied: 
We [the KNCW] would like to use our energy on only one issue: mandating a 
30 percent candidate nomination for SMD election. There were many ideas 
and suggestions by the women’s organizations but we are strategically only 
focusing on the one issue. You need to trust us. If we bring up multiple 
issues, those men will make excuses, oh well too many issues and they are 
confusing, and they will tune out. So we are just focusing on the single issue 
[Interviewee #27, Geum-sook Choi].  
 
After the colloquium, I interviewed an activist who is a leader of a more progressive 
women’s organization, focusing on political empowerment of women. When asked the 
relationship between the two big women’s organizations, the conservative KNCW and the 
liberal KWCU, she echoed what I observed during the colloquium:  
Yes, that is true, the KNCW is not a part of the initiative [to demand the 30 
percent mandatory SMD candidate quotas]…the KNCW decided not to join 
the Alliance. The liberal KWCU is an umbrella organization consists of 144 
women’s organizations, including us and the Korea Women’s Political 
Caucus [hankuk yeosung jungchi yonmang], and the others are affiliated with the 
KNCW…when the women’s organizations discussed and demanded a 50 
percent gender quotas for PR seats in 2003, we had a common goal in spite 
of ideological differences between the KNCW and the KWCU…This time 
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we see many conflicts between these two umbrella groups unlike in 2004 
[Interviewee #25].   
The interviewee #25 also observed that as the women’s movement accomplished 
institutional changes through adopting gender quotas, the movement now has weaker 
driving force or a common goal under which different groups with different ideologies can 
unite:  
I think the agenda of promoting more women legislators was clearer and 
stronger in the 17th and the 18th Assemblies, but not anymore...the female 
legislators who entered the politics through the newly institutionalized gender 
quotas felt the sense of responsibility -- they entered politics through quotas 
– but that sense of indebtedness has pretty much gone now. Also the gender 
quota itself is very controversial so female legislators are not willing to admit 
they were elected through gender quotas [Interviewee #25].  
These interviews explain why women legislators are not evaluated positively, even though 
their legislative records show that women legislators more actively promoted WFBs than 
their male colleagues. Due to the less prestigious status in the Assembly as PR members, the 
majority of women legislators are perceived to lack substantial power in the decision making 
process and were perceived to be compliant of the party leadership. Once elected, women 
prioritize “surviving” the male-dominated and hostile political arena as a numerical minority, 
thus cannot focus on mentoring or recruiting other women. As explained in the existing 
literature on the queen bee syndrome, many women legislators distance themselves from the 
feminist agenda which disappoint the women’s movement outside of the institutionalized 
politics. After successfully lobbied for gender quotas, the women’s movement organizations 
fragmented along the ideological line; the conservative groups and the liberal organizations 
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cannot effectively push the political parties and the National Assembly to nominate more 
women candidates. This undermines the possibility to promote cooperation among women, 
the elected women and the movement, and various women’s organizations.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter addresses the question of who represents women’s interests in the Assembly 
and what do women deliver once they are elected to the National Assembly. In the analysis 
of the legislative activities between 2000 and 2016, I argue women are indeed more active in 
proposing women-related bills, contrary to the sentiments shared by interviewees for this 
research. Qualitative analysis used in this chapter shows that women legislators are perceived 
negatively; specifically, for being less active in promoting women’s issues in the Assembly. 
Moreover, the legislators are perceived as busier attending to their survival as legislators 
rather than promoting other women’s advancement. The level of  support for women 
legislators has waned as the feminist activists were disappointed at the legislators for not 
living up to their expectations; this lack of  support by the women’s movement for the 
elected women makes the political environment more hostile for the female legislators, 
which in turn encourages women to be less active in helping other women or cooperating 
with each other. These behaviors and perceptions of  women legislators fit into the queen 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
Overview of the Main Findings  
What explains women’s continuing underrepresentation in South Korean legislative office, in 
spite of rapid economic growth and implementation of gender quotas? This study used 
South Korea as a case study to test existing theories. In Chapter 2, I examined reasons 
behind women’s numerical representation in the National Assembly of South Korea, 
focusing on the election stage. Findings from the statistical analysis suggest that the gender 
of the candidate is less important than being a major party candidate or running in a 
favorable district. In particular, serving as an SMD member is the surest path to electoral 
victory for women, and the parties should encourage women to be more successful in their 
SMD bids. The expected spillover effect of serving as a PR member or in local political 
offices is weaker than assumed, and this weakness points to the importance of the SMD 
path. And yet, candidates’ PR memberships do not translate well into electoral victories for 
SMD seats, which account for more than 80 percent of all Assembly seats. Political actors 
have compromised with women who demanded more representation by passing gender 
quotas for PR seats and local legislative offices, not for SMD seats. However, taking the high 
stakes and prestige of the SMD membership into consideration, major parties have been 
unwilling to take bolder measures to recruit women in politics.  
Evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that women’s gender is not a liability in elections. 
However, this information does not answer the question of why the majority of PR 
members are not successful at their SMD bids in spite of four years of political experience at 
the national level. In Chapter 3, I analyzed interviews with the former and current legislators 
and their staffers to provide insights into career interruptions and terminations of PR 
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members, especially women. The interviewees’ responses show the high cost involved with 
establishing and maintaining local networks, and how the masculine way of local networking 
undermines the potential power the women’s movement can play in empowering women. 
The limited access to financial resources and leadership positions, overtly discriminatory 
district assignment practice for PR members, and the emphasis on drafting bills without 
geographically defined support group can explain why the majority of PR members 
experience political career interruption and termination after their terms are over.  
In Chapter 4, I focused on substantive representation for women. Who represents 
women’s interests in the National Assembly and what do women deliver once they are 
elected? I analyzed the legislative activities between 2000 and 2016 and found that women 
legislators were indeed more active in proposing women-related bills than male legislators, 
contrary to the sentiments shared by interviewees for this research. Qualitative analysis used 
in this chapter shows that women legislators are perceived negatively as they were identified 
as being less active in promoting women’s issues in the Assembly. The level of  support for 
women legislators has waned as the feminist activists were disappointed at the legislators for 
not living up to their expectations; this lack of  support by the women’s movement for the 
elected women makes the political environment more hostile for female legislators.  
Based on these findings, what should be done to promote numerical and substantive 
representation of  women in South Korea? It is clear that strategies need to be formulated on 
how to nominate and elect more women, and, in turn, how to assure that more women-
friendly policies are proposed. In addition, the promotion of  gender balance in the elected 
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Policy Implications – Evidence from Survey Experiments 
Before the 2016 national legislative elections, the candidate nomination method was at the 
center of the two major parties’ agenda in South Korea. The ruling Saenuri Party leadership 
proposed increased reliance on primaries to select candidates, rather than top-down 
candidate nomination which is a predominant method of candidate nomination in South 
Korea. Then party leader Rep. Moo-Sung Kim argued that the candidate nomination process 
decided by closed-door meetings by a handful of committee members is undemocratic. He 
argued the party should heed more to the dues-paying party members to get involved in the 
candidate nomination process, in a way to democratize the party and to make the process 
more transparent. On the surface, it sounds democratic and ideal, but the resistance to the 
move was very strong, especially among women party members. Instead, women party 
members argued that the party should nominate women through uncontested, strategic 
nomination by the leadership in districts with high level of support for the party.  
During my fieldwork, some participants raised concerns about the primaries and its 
impact on nominating women. In regards to Saenuri party’s attempt to adopt open primaries, 
Interviewee #28 agreed that opening up the candidate selection process to the voters is a 
right direction to take. In the short term, however, it puts younger politicians at disadvantage 
so she prefers strategic nomination to recruit the younger generation. Why?  
In primaries, turnout is lower than that of the national legislative elections, 
which is around 50-60 percent. In order to promote participation in the 
primaries and get support, candidate-hopefuls provide transportation to 
polling places for the voters whom they would like to mobilize. The 
candidate hopefuls catch taxi cabs for the voters and pay the fare to and 
from the polling places for the voters. They even go to the hospitals and ask 
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the patients to come to the polling place in their patient gowns! Voters for 
the primaries do not choose candidates based on their policy proposals; they 
vote for people who they have heard of, who paid for their cab fare, and who 
bought them meals and drinks. In the situation like this, the primaries are for 
those who are better organized and better financed. People buy votes. Even 
though I agree with the party leader [Rep. Moo-Sung Kim of the Saenuri 
Party] that open primaries are the future direction to democratize the party, 
the society is not ready to run the system in a transparent manner 
[Interviewee #28].  
Interviewee #28 is not the only one arguing that primaries are disadvantageous for female 
candidates and political newcomers. Focusing on the main research question of this project 
(Which nomination method is more advantageous for women in securing voters’ support – 
top-down party nominations or bottom-up primaries?) existing studies show that political 
parties’ candidate nomination process and parties’ organizations have an impact on the 
nomination outcomes for women. Primaries are generally thought to be favorable to 
candidates with high visibility, name recognition, social and financial resources (De Luca, 
Jones, and Tula 2002; Poiré 2002), and thus often unfavorable to political newcomers and 
minorities, including women.  
In order to compare how the nomination method affects voters’ perception of the 
candidate and their evaluation of the electoral competitiveness, I designed a survey 
experiment.17 My coauthor and I designed a survey questionnaire asking participants’ 
                                                     
17 This data was originally collected as a part of a project I am currently working on with a coauthor. Even 
though using the same data set, the other work focuses on the split voting and this current work focuses on the 
level of support based on candidates’ gender and nomination paths. The initial findings are presented in the 
following paper: Timothy Rich and Young-Im Lee. 2016. 
“Assessing Strategic Voting through Survey Experiments.” Presented at the International Studies Association – 
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demographic information and political ideology and party affiliation. An online research 
company in Korea, Macromill Embrain, recruited 600 participants and conducted the survey 
on March 7-10, 2016. They were recruited from all 16 regions of South Korea except for Jeju 
Island, but mostly from Seoul and Gyonggi Province (65 percent of the total participants). 
The sample has higher share of self-identified liberals than conservatives. Fifty-one percent 
of the participants supported the Democratic Party and 20 percent of the respondents 
supported the conservative Saenuri Party. Even though the sample is unrepresentative, it still 
provides unique insights as to how voters perceive candidates’ electoral competitiveness 
based on the candidate’s gender and nomination paths.  
Before answering the experimental questions, 55 percent of the respondents said 
they did not know candidates’ paths to nomination running in their districts, and 39 percent 
said they knew some candidates’ nomination paths. When asked about preferred method of 
candidate nomination, 62 percent of the respondents said they had no preference; 25 percent 
preferred primaries and 13 percent preferred strategic party nomination. This shows that 
overall the voters are not keen on knowing how the candidates are nominated, and the 
nomination paths are not an often-used information shortcut when making decisions in 
actual election setting.   
However, a series of hypothetical National Assembly district elections reveal that 
when the voters know the nomination paths of candidates, they assess the viability of 
candidates differently by gender and nomination paths. The experiment is set up this way. 
There are three hypothetical candidates running in the respondent’s district, ranked based on 
their ideological proximity to the respondent: Candidate A is 90 percent similar, Candidate B 
                                                     
Midwest Conference, St. Louis, Missouri. I got permission from the coauthor to use this data for this chapter; 
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is 60 percent similar, and Candidate C is only 30 percent similar to the respondent’s political 
ideology. In this setting, a rational voter should vote for Candidate A as the candidate is 
likely to represent the respondent’s interests most closely if elected. And then, the 
respondents are presented with four sequential public opinion polls, showing that the level 
of support for Candidate A is decreasing in each poll (Table 5.1.). The poll is originally 
designed to gauge the level of strategic voting by candidates’ gender and paths to 
nomination. However, some of the findings from this projects are relevant to this current 
research.  
Table 5.1. Polling Results as Shown to the Survey Respondents 
 
Poll 1 Poll 2 Poll 3 Poll 4 
Candidate A 35% 30% 25% 21% 
Candidate B 33% 35% 36% 37% 
Candidate C 32% 35% 39% 42% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Then I devised six different prompts where the candidates’ gender and nomination paths 
vary. In this chapter, I limit the discussion on the four prompts which are relevant to the 
current project.  
- Prompt 1: All male candidates, all chosen via primaries. 
- Prompt 3: Candidate A is female, Candidates B and C male, A is via nomination and 
B and C are primaries. 
- Prompt 4: Candidate A is female, Candidates B and C male, A is chosen by primaries 
and B and C by party nomination. 
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Table 5.2. Summary of the Experimental Prompts 
Prompt Candidate A Candidate B Candidate C 
1 M-PR M-PR M-PR 
3 F-Nom M-PR M-PR 
4 F-PR M-Nom M-Nom 
6 F-Nom M-Nom M-Nom 
M (male), F (female), Nom (nominated by the party), PR (selected through primary) 
 
 
Note: Dots represent Candidate A; diamonds Candidate B and squares Candidate C 
Figure 5.1. Level of Support for Each Candidate by Randomization 
 
Figure 5.1. presents the level of support for three candidates in each prompt. 
Overall, Prompts 1, 4, and 6 show a similar pattern, even though the gap between A and B 
varies in each prompt. In Prompts 1 and 4, Candidate A get 80 percent of support. 
Candidate A is a male in Prompt 1 and a female in Prompt 4 but won primaries in both 
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not make a different in the base level of support. Similarly, in Prompts 3 and 6, when 
Candidate A won the nomination by the party leadership, the level of support is lower than 
Prompt 1 and 4 when candidate won primaries. Therefore, the nomination type is more 
important than the gender of the candidate.  
When the poll number slips for A in Poll 2, some respondents defect from 
Candidate A choose B instead, but more so in Prompt 1 than in Prompt 4. In Prompt 4, the 
female candidate is running against two males who were nominated by the party leadership 
whereas all three candidates in Prompt 1 won primaries. So when a primary winning 
candidate is running against party-nominated candidates, he or she can retain still high level 
of support even when the poll numbers slip.   
In Prompt 3, the starting level of support for A, a party-nominated female running 
against primary-winning males, is lower than the level of support for A in other prompts. 
Prompt 6 shows about 70 percent of the respondents supported Candidate A when her poll 
number is strong and running against other males who were also nominated by the party. 
Interestingly, these two party-nominated women suffer loss of support when their poll 
numbers decline, but more dramatically when she is running against other males who won 
the primaries, thus previously “proving” their electoral competitiveness. In Prompt 3, a 
primary-winning male outperforms party-nominated female when the poll number indicates 
he is ahead of the female candidate by 5 percentage points in the poll. In Prompt 6, a party-
nominated female is still ahead of a party-nominated male, even though the poll numbers 
suggest the man is slightly ahead of the woman.  
What do these findings suggest on the policy of candidate nomination and election 
for women? First, when women prove their electoral competitiveness through primaries and 
previous electoral victory (as shown in Chapter 2), they are as successful as men in securing 
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support. Second, even though some activists and women’s movement demand strategic 
nomination for women (as illustrated in Chapter 3), voters do not respond favorably to 
candidates who were chosen by party leadership. When a woman was nominated by a party, 
the base-line support level is lower than a woman who won primaries (Prompts 3 and 4); 
when a man won primaries (Candidate B), he is more likely to attract defectors from 
Candidate A when his poll numbers favor him, than he is nominated by the party (Prompts 
3 and 6).  
Based on this data, my recommendation is for parties to support female candidate 
hopefuls and ensure success in winning primaries. This will signal to the voters that these 
female candidates have “what it takes” to be competitive in elections, rather than the 
message that they are “unqualified” beneficiaries of affirmative action. However, this is a 
“chicken and egg” problem. Chapter 3 illustrates how challenging it is to navigate the 
national and local politics as an outsider. When competing against an incumbent who already 
has a strong local support network, women and PR members find it challenging to establish 
their own alternative support network. In order to be successful in primaries, however, one 
needs a strong support network. Considering these insurmountable challenges, the women’s 
movement requires strategic nomination by the party leadership to promote women’s 
candidacy.  
However, this study argues that these party-chosen women will not be as successful 
as primary-winning women in securing high level of support, as voters are more likely to 
reject these nominated women when the situation is volatile. Thus, I argue that political 
parties and the civil society should focus more on training and grooming potential female 
candidate hopefuls and help them establish their own local support base, instead of 
nominating women with only weak connections imminent to an election. Related to the 
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findings in Chapters 2 and 3, political parties’ allowing PR nomination only once results in 
the experienced national legislators’ career termination. This “term limit” might be intended 
to reach out to an untapped talent pool and supply “fresh blood” instead of appointing again 
those who are already in the system. However, if the parties do not support the PR women 
to be competitive in the district tiers, they are wasting a pool of experienced and qualified 
women politicians.  
 
Significance of the Study and Limitations 
This research contributes to the literature on politics and gender, as well as providing 
policy insights on how to increase political representation of political minorities. The existing 
literature argues that the most critical player in numerical underrepresentation of women are 
not voters or low political ambition of women, but political party elites’ discriminative 
nomination practices. I tested these theories on the South Korean context. This work 
contributes to the scholarly discussion on gender quotas by introducing a less-discussed case 
of  South to English-speaking scholars and by providing an analysis of the country utilizing 
original data. This study is by no means the first one addressing the South Korean case in 
English: Lee and Shin (2016), Shin (2014), and Yoon and Shin (2015) all provide rich context 
of  the adoption and implementation of  gender quotas, and discuss the reasons why the 
political parties do not comply with the provisions using qualitative analysis on the impact of  
gender quotas. However, the current study complements the previous studies on Korea’s 
gender quotas adoption and implementation by testing the theories using a large-N 
quantitative analysis.  
Moreover, there is relatively little empirical research testing the pipeline theory. This 
study casts doubt on the validity of the pipeline problem, and tests political parties’ 
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unwillingness to recruit women using both a large- N statistical analysis and interviews with 
the political actors, which support and strengthen the findings from the quantitative analysis.  
In addition, this study is unique in scope as it examines all the candidates in the 
previous eight elections since the country’s democratization, including the most recent 
legislative elections in April of  2016. Existing studies on South Korean national legislative 
elections analyzed one or two election cycles, not all eight elections since democratization. 
The study’s findings are timely and up-to-date as well, considering the 20th elections were 
only one year prior to the timing of  this writing.  
The empirical evidence that this study examines points to an urgent need for South 
Korean political parties to take more direct measures to increase women’s representation in 
the National Assembly. The current study is one of  the few endeavors to empirically, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, test the spillover effect of  gender quotas in the mixed system 
and the sacrificial lamb theory. In addition, the invisible hierarchy between PR and SMD 
members in the mixed legislature of  South Korea is addressed, along with the political 
parties’ candidate nomination practices in applying the mandated gender quotas (a term 
limit). These political culture and institutions have not been widely discussed and they 
influence the effectiveness of  gender quotas in promoting gender parity in the legislature 
over time.  
However, this study is not without limitations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the level 
of  women’s political participation in three East Asian democracies vary, in spite of  similar 
level of  economic performance and similar electoral system. Based on this in-depth case 
study on South Korea, the future research should be a comparative study of  gender in 
legislative politics, possibly one encompassing South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Also, future 
research can examine how and whether each candidate’s nomination type affected their 
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Appendix A. Notes on Qualitative Method18  
Describing his research method as “soaking and poking,” Richard Fenno wrote “someone 
doing this kind of  research is quite likely to have no crystallized idea of  what he or she is 
looking for or what questions to ask when he or she starts” (Fenno 1978, 250).19 This 
sentence aptly describes my own fieldwork experience. While writing a dissertation research 
proposal in 2014, I wrote sample interview questions as a part of  application package to the 
Institutional Research Board to get approval to conduct fieldwork. About a year later, I went 
to Seoul to conduct fieldwork.  
My first interviewee was a senior legislative staffer who had more than 20 years of  
political campaign experience and work experience in the National Assembly. Trying my best 
to conceal my nerves as a first-time interviewer, I started to read out loud the questions I 
wrote during the IRB application process. He looked at me quietly for a minute, without 
saying anything. Then he slowly spoke, firmly but with a dismissing undertone, that the 
questions were too generic and too general to gather insightful response from politicians. 
Politicians are “animals,” he informed me, and they instantly tell the depth of  the interviewer 
and decide if  they would like to engage in a deep conversation with the person. He did not 
answer any of  my “generic” questions and told me to go back to the drawing board.  
I quickly learned, with surging sense of  humility and embarrassment, that asking the 
same set of  questions to all the interviewees was not the best approach. From my second 
interview, I spent one to two days before each interview reading almost everything in print 
and online about the interviewee before the actual meeting. I pored over books, news 
                                                     
18 The style of this appendix is influenced by Brown, Nadia E. 2014. Sisters in the Statehouse: Black Women & 
Legislative Decision Making. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
19 Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.  
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articles, and magazines; I looked up data on their bill sponsorship activities. Based on the 
information, I tailored the interview questions for each interviewee. I implicitly showed that 
I did my homework through my highly personalized interview questions. I was taken more 
seriously and also could minimize spending time checking information which could have 
been collected myself  elsewhere. It was lucky that my first interviewee was extremely direct 
and straightforward. It was difficult to swallow at first but it helped me to be more effective 
and efficient in the subsequent interviews.    
I chose to use interviews for a couple of  reasons. As a research on gender issues, I 
think it is important to listen to people and understand the political process from their 
perspectives. As an outsider of  the National Assembly or party politics, I had to talk to 
people in order to understand how political processes actually work. There is only so much I 
could learn about politics through printed materials or the media reports. Politics is 
constantly under scrutiny by the media but also a lot of  aspects in politics is not open to the 
outsiders. I wanted to learn how the insiders actually to politics. Second, I wanted to flesh 
out the statistical findings on the election process – to explain “why” political parties are still 
unwilling to nominate women even though the numbers say women are as competitive as 
men in election, and “why” the majority of  the PR members experience career termination 
and could not capitalize their four years’ of  experience as a national legislator.  
Conducting interviews is also a way to play to my personal merits/strengths as a 
researcher. Luckily, I knew people who knew politicians and activists through my personal 
networks. I was born, raised, and educated in Seoul until my mid-20s. Some students and 
alumni from my alma mater in Seoul worked for the National Assembly and various political 
parties. My professors in Korea knew former and current legislators and they connected me 
with the legislators and legislative staffers. My other local linchpins – my friends and alumni 
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network from my alma mater – listened to the overview of  my research and contacted 
people they thought would be relevant to my research. They explained to the potential 
interviewees my personal and educational background and suggested they sit for an 
interview. After a couple of  initial interviews, it snowballed and my interviewees introduced 
me to other interviewees. Thus having this social capital was critical in conducting the 
interviews. I tried a couple of  times sending out letters “cold turkey,” but I was not lucky 
with these attempts.  
Fenno (1978) discusses how the legislators’ perceptions of  academics influence his 
interaction with the interviewees. Overall, I think my status as a Ph.D. candidate in the 
United States gave me some credentials as an interviewer. Those who have Ph.D. themselves 
or working on their degree were more favorable to talk to me. They were supportive and 
told me they understood what it is like to write a dissertation. Those more into practical over 
academic experience sometimes expressed their uneasiness (and sometimes disdain) about 
those they considered unexperienced academics who do not know the “real” politics. Some 
interviewees who are critical about the U.S. hegemony and who have strong national pride 
expressed a bit of  uncomfortable sentiment about me, a student studying in the United 
States, due to South Korea’s dependent relationship with the “big brother” America.  
As the main research focus was gender in politics, the interviewees’ opinions on the 
issue also influenced the mode of  the interviewees’ interaction with me. Some interviewees 
were distant and careful and very formal in addressing me. Even though I was not “Dr. Lee” 
yet, some felt uncomfortable addressing me by my first name or addressing my name at all 
and insisted that they would call me “Dr. Lee” to make the conversation formal. Those who 
have feminist identity were very welcoming and friendly and showed a sense of  comradery. 
Some men who were uncomfortable with the issue of  gender and politics were at times 
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dismissive and authoritative and argued that the issue of  gender is irrelevant in Korean 
politics.  
Most of  the interviewees preferred to meet in the afternoon. Usually I did two 
interviews per day, one at 2pm and the other at 4pm. Some interviewees asked for the 
interview questions in advance and were very careful during the interview. I made sure that I 
would not use parts of  the conversation they shared “off  the record,” I also kept the 
confidentiality of  the interviewees. I asked them how they would like to be referred to in my 
writing, if  they were comfortable using their real names then I named them as such. If  they 
wanted to be only identified with their party affiliation and position, I made that reference. 
For the first couple of  interviews, I asked for permission to record the interviews and 
recorded only when the interviewee agreed. The majority of  the interviewees did not want 
to be recorded, fearing their remarks could be misunderstood, so later in the fieldwork I did 
not even bother to ask. Instead I took copious notes during the interview; right after the 
interviews, I tried to write down as much as I could remember. I transcribed the 9 interviews 
I did record. Each interview lasted as short as 50 minutes to as long as 3 hours and 30 
minutes.  
Overall, my cultural heritage and social capital – my previous education in South 
Korea and connection to political actors – made me more approachable to the interviewees. 
As a native Korean speaker, moreover, I could read the nuances and non-verbal cues during 
the interview and could ask in-depth question on complex issues without relying on other 
mediators such as interpreters or translators. My language skills also enabled me to read and 
analyze the original data: the majority of  data (news articles, magazines, and bills) are written 
in Korean. Therefore, I think using mixed method for this current research was an 
appropriate approach.  
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Appendix B. Tentative Face-to-Face Interview Questions 
As written in Appendix A, I did not closely follow these interview questions after the first 
interview. However, I tailored the following questions based on the background of the 
interviewees. Some of the questions were inspired by Kira Sanbonmatsu, Susan J. Carroll, 
and Debbie Walsh. 2009. Poised to Run: Women’s Pathway to the State Legislature. New 
Brunswick, NJ. 
With candidates and candidate dropouts who have gone through major parties’ 
nomination process   
1) Have you ever seriously considered running for office before someone had 
suggested? Was it totally your idea to run? If someone suggested that you should 
run, who was it? (i.e. Party officials, NGOs, legislators, friends, family, etc.) Who 
was the most critical actor to make that decision?  
2) Why did you decide to run for office?  
3) Who discouraged you the most, if any? What were their reasons? 
4) FOR SMD CANDIDATES -- Which district did you originally apply for 
nomination? Were you assigned to the one you applied? If yes, why had you 
preferred that district to others, and how had you appealed to the nomination 
committee that you were a suitable candidate for that district? If you were 
assigned to another district, what were the reasons for the decision? In your 
opinion, how did the district assignment affect the electoral outcomes? 
5) FOR PR CANDIDATES – How did you become a PR candidate? Had anyone 
approached you to become the PR candidate, or did you nominate yourself? 
What was your number in the party list, and how was the party list made? Did 
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you feel any expectations (service, financial, etc.) during and after the election 
from the party, as you “benefitted” from the party for your nomination/election?  
6) Have you been involved in women’s committee in your party? Have you ever 
participated in the movement or debates on nominating more women, or party 
gender quotas? If you have, why? If not, why not?  
7) In your opinion, what are the major reasons for women’s under-nomination? Is 
it a problem that your party should address? What do you think of the debates 
and conflicts surrounding party gender quotas?  
8) What will be legitimate and effective ways to nominate more women candidates? 
How can women candidates appeal to voters?  
9) Are there any other things you want me to consider? 
 
With those who have served in nomination committees or involved in nomination 
process in the major parties 
1) How were you involved in the nomination process? How were you recruited? 
2) What were the criteria the committee had considered when assessing candidate 
hopefuls? What were different considerations in assessing PR and SMD 
candidates?  
3) What were the main disagreements among committee members in the 
nomination decision-making process? Were there any differences in foci between 
young and senior members? Party machinery and eternal reviewers? Women and 
Men committee members? 
4) If there were two candidates similarly qualified, which criteria did you use to 
determine the nomination results? 
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5) What kind of data/evidence was used to determine “winnable districts”? Did you 
rely on previous election results?  
6) How did the committee decide that it was strategically sound to nominate 
women? What kind of women did you look for? Where were they usually 
assigned? 
7) How did parties get potential candidate lists for PR candidates? And how were 
PR candidates ranked? Who did get priorities? 
8) How did the committee handle any objections or complaints about the 




1) What was the process of your election campaign? Whom did you approach to learn 
to organize the campaign when you ran for the first time? Please explain.  
2) How much support did you get from your family? How did they contribute to your 
campaign?  
3) Who was your main target for your campaign? How did you try to appeal to them?  
4) What was the reaction from voters in your district when you were canvassing? Were 
there any differences between men and women voters? Younger generation and 
older generation? Where did you visit? What were your strategies? 
5) Were there any groups of people who approached you with certain policy agendas? 
Who were they and what were their demands / issues?  
6) (If the person is a multiple term member) In your previous ** years of service in the 
National Assembly, have you observed any changes in the culture of the Assembly? 
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Do you think the presence of more women legislators changed the culture or the 
norm of the Assembly in any ways?  
7)  In your opinion, why are there few women in the national assembly? Do you think it 
is a problem? 
8)  In your opinion, what are some of the measures to elect more women to the 
National Assembly? How can women candidates improve their competitiveness in 
campaigns? 
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